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INTRODUCTION 
At times, concepts of criminal law spill over into its civil coun­
terpart, thereby affecting the liberty interests of one of the parties 
involved in a civil proceeding.l There is no clearer example of this 
merger of criminal and civil law than under chapter 123A of the 
Massachusetts General Laws ("chapter 123A").2 Under this stat­
ute, a civil process can become the vehicle for the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts ("Commonwealth") to indefinitely commit a per­
son who is found by a jury or a court to be a sexually dangerous 
* John F. Kavanagh, Jr., J.D., Western New England College School of Law; 
Matthew C. Welnicki, J.D., Northeastern University School of Law. The authors are 
private practitioners in Massachusetts. At the time this article was written, Mr. Kava­
nagh and Mr. Welnicki were employed by the Trial Court of Massachusetts as Law 
Clerks to the Justices of the Superior Court. The view~ contained herein are in no way 
endorsed by the Trial Court or any divisions of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
1. Throughout this article, the authors will refer to a person against whom a chap­
ter 123A proceeding has been brought as "defendant," "inmate," "person," "prisoner," 
and other titles in accordance with the applicable sections of the Massachusetts General 
Laws. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A (2000). 
2. Care, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Sexually Dangerous Persons, MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 123A (2000). 
1 
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person.3 Such a commitment has the potential to restrain a per­
son's freedom, to force him or her to undergo treatment to correct 
the alleged disorder, and create a social stigma that can last 
throughout a person's lifetime.4 
The current version of chapter 123A may have serious conse­
quences for persons subjected to its provisions. Because it is rela­
tively new, the appellate courts have only begun to give the law 
ample legal analysis. Moreover, the statute contains numerous con~ 
voluted procedural requirements and time restraints.5 It follows, 
therefore, that the statute deserves a great deal of scrutiny and 
careful review by any counsel, court, or defendant involved in chap­
ter 123A proceedings.6 This is also an area of law that will un­
doubtedly evolve as the courts and legislature monitor the statute's 
shortcomings as well as its successes? 
The purpose of this article is threefold. First, it is designed to 
provide a brief history of chapter 123A of the Massachusetts Gen­
eral Laws. Second, this article will offer an overview of the Massa­
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision in Commonwealth v. 
Bruno.8 Third, it will present a detailed road map of chapter 123A. 
Where appropriate, this article will highlight important areas of law 
and procedural requirements, as well as note relevant decisions of 
the Massachusetts Superior Court, the court before which chapter 
123A proceedings are brought. Finally, this article will conduct a 
brief analysis of certain complications arising under this statute, 
most of which the Massachusetts courts have not yet fully ad­
dressed, and which should be of particular significance to any party 
involved in a 123A proceeding. This final discussion is in no way 
intended to be an exhaustive account of all of the potential issues 
that may arise under the statute. Instead, its purpose is to highlight 
selected issues most likely to develop as this area of law continues 
to evolve. 
3. 1999 Mass. Acts 74, § 14(d). 
4. See id. 
5. See discussion infra Part II (providing a discussion of Commonwealth v. Bruno, 
735 N.E.2d 1222 (Mass. 2000»; infra Part III (providing a discussion of MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 123A (2000». 
6. See generally MCLE, INC., SDP HEARINGS: LEARN THE LAW, MEDICINE AND 
PRACTICE INVOLVED IN COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSONS (2001). 
7. Additional information on this evolving statute can be found at the web site of 
the Committee for Public Counsel Services ("CPCS"), Mental Health Litigation Unit, 
available at http://www.state.ma.us/cpcs/mhp/mhpSDP.html. CPCS's web site provides 
an overview of chapter 123A and provides updates and practical information for attor­
neys who represent, or are interested in representing, persons subjected to this statute. 
8. 735 N.E.2d 1222 (Mass. 2000). 
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF CHAPTER 123A OF 
THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS 
Massachusetts is not alone in enacting a statute that subjects 
people classified as "sexually dangerous persons" to civil commit­
ment for an indeterminate and possibly indefinite period of time.9 
Partly in response to increased pressure from the public and the 
media, many state legislatures have enacted similar statutes to pre­
vent recidivism in persons who have previously been convicted of 
crimes of a sexual nature and have been released back into soci­
ety.lO Additionally, states have passed laws requiring persons con­
victed of certain sexual crimes to register with local police 
departments in order to allow members of the public to request and 
. obtain information on any registered person.H 
While the current incarnation of the Massachusetts sexually 
dangerous persons statute may have been the result of recent pres­
sure and a desire to follow the national trend, chapter 123A itself is 
not new. The original version of the statute was first enacted in 
1947.12 Subsequently, the statute underwent several amendments 
9. While the term "sexually dangerous person" is sometimes replaced with "sexu­
ally violent predator," or "convicted sex offender," other states have statutes that are 
similar to chapter 123A. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to 36-3707 (West 2001); 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-02 (West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-13­
201 to 16-13-216 (West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17a-566 to 17a-570 (2001); 725 ILL. 
COMPo STAT. ANN., 205/.01 to 205/.12 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.1 (West 
2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a15 (Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 253B (West Supp. 2001-2002); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2922 to 29-2936 (Supp. 2001); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:47-1 to 2C:47-10, 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-11 (West Supp. 2001); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 43-1-1 (West 2000); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 426.510 to 426.680 (2001); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-301 to 33-6-306 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-16-1 to 77-16-5 
(1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-300 to 19.2-311 (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.09.020 (West Supp. 2001-2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01 to 980.06 (West 2000). 
10. For a detailed discussion of public and media influences on courts and legisla­
tures to pass laws that deal harshly with convicted sex offenders, see Michelle Johnson, 
The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Sentencing of Sexual Predators, 8 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 39 (1998). For a detailed history of sex offender laws and their prede­
cessors including the sexual psychopath statutes that were passed between 1930-1960, 
see Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 1317 (1998). . 
The Ohio legislature recently amended its sexual offender laws to cover minors. 
See Taft Signs Bill Subjecting Teens to Megan's Law, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 28, 
2001, available at http://enquirer.com!editions/2001/07/28/; Andrew Welsh-Huggins, 
Plan Seeks to Lower "Sexual Predator" Age, CiNCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 10, 2001, 
available at http://enquirer.com!editions/2001lQ4/1O/. 
11. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS.ch. 178C (2000); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 803, 
§ 1.40 (2001). 
12. 1947 Mass. Acts 683. 
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over the intervening years until its repeal in 1990.13 
Prior to its repeal in 1990, chapter 123A, section 4 of the Mas­
sachusetts General Laws provided that once a defendant was found 
guilty of a sexual offense iri the superior court, the court or the 
Commonwealth could initiate an examination of the defendant by a 
qualified examiner. The examination would determine whether the 
defendant was a sexually dangerous person14 and should be sub­
jected to further observation and diagnosis.15 In such instances, this 
examination would occur after the defendant was found guilty but 
prior to sentencing.16 Under the old version of chapter 123A, if the 
examiners' reports did not clearly indicate that the defendant was 
sexually dangerous, then the court would proceed to impose a sen­
tence on the original offense.17 If the qualified examiners filed re­
13. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A (1947), amended by 1954 Mass. Acts 686, 1958 
Mass. Acts 646, and 1985 Mass. Acts 752; 1990 Mass. Acts 150, § 304 (repealing the 
provisions of chapter 123A that provided for the commitment of sexually dangerous 
persons); id. § 104 (requiring those defendants committed under the statute prior to the 
repeal to remain subject to its provisions, including treatment). 
14. Under the previous version of chapter 123A of the Massachusetts General 
Laws, a "sexually dangerous person" was defined as: 
[A]ny person whose misconduct in sexual matters indicates a general lack of 
power to control his sexual impulses, as evidenced by repetitive or compulsive 
sexual misconduct by either violence against any victim, or aggression against 
any victim under the age of sixteen years, and who, as a result, is likely to 
attack or otherwise inflict injury on such victims because of his uncontrolled or 
uncontrollable desires .. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (1989) (repealed 1990). 
15. Prior to its repeal, chapter 123A, section 4 of the Massachusetts General Laws 
read in pertinent part: 
Upon the determination of gUilt of a person in the superior court of a sexual 
offense ... the court may, on its own motion or upon motion of the common­
wealth, prior to imposing sentence, cause the person to be examined by a qual­
ified examiner at the court or jail in which the person is held, or at any other 
place if the person is not in custody. The examiner shall conduct a screening 
examination for sexual dangerousness, and shall report within ten days to the 
court in writing on a form provided by the commonwealth. Such report shall 
include the examiner's recommendation as to whether or not the person ex­
amined should be committed to the center for further observation and 
diagnosis. 
[d. § 4. 
16. !d. 
17. Prior to its repeal, chapter 123A, section 5 of the Massachusetts General Laws 
read in pertinent part: 
If, after a person['s] sixty day period of observation, the report filed with 
the court by the two qualified examiners clearly indicates that the person is a 
sexually dangerous person, the court shall give notice to such person that a 
hearing will be held to determine whether or not he is a sexually dangerous 
person. If said report does not clearly indicate that the person is a sexually 
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ports indicating that the defendant was, in their opinion, sexually 
dangerous, then the court would hold a hearing to determine 
whether the defendant was to be cla~sified as a "sexually dangerous 
person."18 Once the defendant was determined to be a "sexually 
dangerous person," the court would then order that the defendant 
be committed and undergo treatment for an "indeterminate period 
of a minimum of one day and a maximum of such person's natural 
life."19 This commitment would run concurrently with a sentence 
imposed on the underlying sexual offense.2o Any defendant com­
mitted under this statute was entitled to petition the court annually 
for his or her release.21 
In chapter 74, sections 3 through 8 of the Massachusetts Acts 
and Resolves of 1999, the Massachusetts legislature gave new life to 
the repealed provisions of chapter 123A of Massachusetts General 
Laws.22 Under these revisions, the Commonwealth, through a local 
District Attorney's office or the Office of the Attorney General of 
the Commonwealth, could petition the Superior Court for the com­
mitment and treatment of sexually dangerous persons.23 Due to the 
fact that chapter 123A allows the Commonwealth to compromise a 
defendant's liberty interests in the attempt to protect society from 
dangerous person, the court shall proceed to impose sentence as provided by 
law for the original offense. . 
Upon the motion of a person for whom a hearing is to be held or upon its 
own motion, the court shall, if necessary to protect the rights of such person, 
appoint counsel for him. Such person shall be entitled to have process issued 
from the court to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. Upon such 
hearing it shall be competent to introduce evidence of the person's juvenile 
and adult court and probation records, psychiatric and psychological records, 
and any other evidence that tends to indicate that he is a sexually dangerous 
person. Any qualified examiner's report flied under this chapter shall be ad­
missible in evidence in such hearing. 
If the court finds upon such hearing that the person is not a sexually dan­
gerous person, it shall proceed to impose sentence as provided by law for the 
original offense. If the court finds upon such hearing that the person is a sexu­
ally dangerous person, it shall sentence such person as provided by law for the 
original offense and may also commit such person to the center, ... for an 
indeterminate period of a minimum of one day and a maximum of such per­
son's natural life. A person who is both committed and sentenced under this 
section shall serve such sentence concurrently with the commitment. 
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 5 (1989) (repealed 1990). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. § 9 (1989) (repealed 1990). 
22. 1999 Mass. Acts 74. 
23. See discussion infra Part lILA (discussing the definition of "sexually danger­
ous persons"). 
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sexual predators, the statute's constitutionality has come into ques­
tion in the courts of Massachusetts.24 
The United States Supreme Court resolved many constitu­
tional questions when it found Kansas' sexually violent predator 
commitment statute to be constitutionally sound in Kansas v. Hen­
dricks .25 Similar to chapter 123A, the Kansas statute allows for the 
civil commitment of "any person who has been convicted of or 
charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person 
likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence. "26 The Supreme 
Court held that the Kansas statute was constitutional because it sat­
isfied due process requirements, did not violate the defendant's 
double jeopardy rights, and was not an ex post facto criminallaw.27 
24. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found chapter 123A to be consti­
tutionally sound. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d 1222, 1240 (Mass. 2000); see 
discussion infra Part II. Constitutional challenges to the statute, however, continue to 
arise. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 762 N.E.2d 794, 794 (Mass. 2001) (allowing 
defendant's motion to dismiss upon concluding that there was a "violation of the clear 
and unambiguous statutory language requiring (a) that the defendant in a G.L. c. 123A 
case be committed for an initial period not exceeding sixty days, and (b) that the reports 
of the examination and diagnosis be filed within forty-five days"). 
25. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). ' 
26. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (2000). 
27. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356-71. Justice Thomas, writing the opinion for the 5-4 
majority, first addressed the defendant's argument that the Act's definition of "mental 
abnormality" did not satisfy substantive due process requirements. Id. at 356. The 
Court stated that "an individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physi­
cal restraint may be overridden even in the civil context." Id. The Court then con­
cluded that a defendant's mental illness and a likelihood of future dangerousness can be 
grounds for civil confinement. Id. at 358. "[L]ack of volitional control, coupled with a 
prediction ot' future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes [a defendant] from other 
dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through crimi­
nal proceedings. [A defendant's] diagnosis as a pedophile ... under the [statute], thus 
plainly suffices for due process purposes." Id. at 360. 
The Court then addressed the arguments that the civil commitment was ex post 
facto lawmaking and subjected defendants to double jeopardy. Id. at 361. The Court 
noted that in order for these two principles to apply, the Kansas Act would have to be 
classified as criminal and subject a person to punishment. Id. at 361. The Court ulti­
mately concluded that the Act was not punishment, as it did not implicate the two 
primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence. Id. at 361-62. 
Furthermore, the Act did not criminalize conduct that was legal before its enactment. 
Id. at 371. The Court concluded that double jeopardy would not arise in such situations 
and the defendant would not be punished for the same crime twice, because the original 
conviction would be used for an evidentiary purpose to show his or her dangerousness. 
Id. at 369-70. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice 
Thomas' opinion. Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Breyer filed a dis-' 
senting opinion in which Justices Stevens and Souter joined, and Justice Ginsburg 
joined in part. 
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Given the current trend in the law, it appears that civil statutes 
impacting the post-incarceration liberties and conduct of convicted 
sex offenders are on solid ground. In Massachusetts for example, 
the Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") determined the Sex Offender 
Registration Act to be constitutional.28 Specifically, the SJC ruled 
that the Act did not violate constitutional principles of due process 
rights, equal protection rights, protections from invasions of pri-
Justice Kennedy did not appear to be entirely comfortable with the concept of civil 
commitment for sexually dangerous persons. Id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring). His 
concurrence seems to suggest that not all civil commitment statutes are constitutional 
and that the Court should revisit the issue after the true impact of these statutes is 
known. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If, however, civil confinement were to become 
a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, or if it were shown that mental ab­
normality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil 
detention is justified, our precedents would not suffice to validate it."). 
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissenting Justices, agreed that the Act's "definition 
of 'mental abnormality' satisfies the 'substantive' due process requirements," but was 
not convinced that the Act did not inflict further punishment on defendants. Id. at 373­
74 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent was especially concerned that the defendant in 
the case before it was not provided with treatment until after his release from prison, 
and when he did receive treatment, the treatment was inadequate. Id. (Breyer, J., dis­
senting). This appears to leave open the possibility that at least some of the dissenting 
Justices would join the majority if better treatment was offered at an earlier stage in a 
person's incarceration. Justice Breyer also stated that "[t]o find a violation of [the Ex 
Post Facto Clause] here, however, is not to hold that the Clause prevents Kansas, or 
other States, from enacting dangerous sexual offender statutes." Id. at 395. In the ap­
pendix to his opinion, Breyer noted that the Kansas statute is the only one of its kind 
that specifically: 1) delays treatment, 2) fails to consider less restrictive alternatives, and 
3) applies to pre-Act crimes. Id. app. at 397 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
In another recent Supreme Court decision, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion 
relied on Kansas v. Hendricks in determining that a defendant charged under a state's 
sexual predator statute is foreclosed from raising the argument that the statute violates 
constitutional provisions of double jeopardy and ex post facto punishment as the terms 
of the statutory commitment are "applied to" him. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 250 
(2001). The Court concluded that the "as applied to" analysis would never definitively 
determine whether commitment and confinement prescribed by the statute was puni­
tive and thereby in violation of the aforementioned constitutional provisions. Id. at 
262. In his discussion, Justice Stevens asserted that the majority had assumed the stat­
ute was civil and not criminal, and had not conducted analYSis related to the double 
jeopardy and ex post facto constitutional ramifications. Id. at 275-76 (Stevens, J., dis­
senting). For a detailed discussion of Seling v. Young, see Kathleen Dolegowski, Sexu­
ally Violent Predator Act Does Not Offend Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, 
LAW. J., Apr. 6, 2001, at 2. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Supreme Court revisited Kansas' sexually vio­
lent predator statute. Kansas v. Crane, 122 S.Ct. 867 (2002). In Kansas v. Crane, the 
Court held the statute did not require the state to prove an offender's total or complete 
lack of control over his dangerous behavior. Id. at 870. The Federal Constitution does 
not, however, allow civil commitment under the statute without any lack of control 
determination. Id. 
28. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 668 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. 1996). 
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vacy, or protection from ex post facto laws.29 More recently, with 
respect to chapter 123A, the SJC upheld the statute's constitution­
ality in Commonwealth v; Bruno.3D 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF COMMONWEALTH V. BRUNO 
In Commonwealth v. Bruno, the SJC took the opportunity to 
address several unresolved issues regarding chapter 123A.31 This 
section of the article will explore the Bruno decision in hopes of 
achieving a better grasp of how the SJC interprets chapter 123A. 
Preliminarily, however, it is first important to understand the proce­
dural posture of Bruno. . 
A. Procedural Posture 
The three defendants in the Bruno case, Lawrence A. Bruno, 
James D. Wilson, and Carlos L. Davila, committed sexual offenses 
before the effective date of the amendments to chapter 123A.32 
Prior to each defendant's scheduled release, the Commonwealth 
filed a petition seeking to commit each defendant as a sexually dan­
gerous person.33 Each defendant filed a successful motion to dis­
miss the Commonwealth's petition.34 The Commonwealth then 
appealed each order to dismiss.35 
The judge in Mr. Wilson's case ordered Mr. Wilson committed 
and reported his order to the appeals court along with six questions 
of law.36 The appeals court (Laurence, J.) then heard the Common­
wealth's motion to stay Mr. Wilson's release from civil commit­
29. Id. at 739. 
30. 735 N.E.2d 1222 (Mass. 2000). 
31. Id. at 1225-26; see 1999 Mass. Acts 74, §§ 3-8. 
32. September 10, 1999 was the effective date of the Massachusetts Act amending 
chapter 123A, and the Act has remained unamended since that time. MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 123A (2000); 1999 Mass. Acts. 74, §§ 3-8. There are a number of offenses that can 
trigger the civil confinement proceedings. In this case, the defendant Bruno was sen­
tenced to a ten-to-twenty-year sentence for aggravated rape on November 2, 1981. The 
defendant Davila was sentenced to a two and one-half-year sentence for rape to which 
he pled guilty on November 10, 1997. The defendant Wilson was sentenced to a six-to­
ten-year sentence for indecent assault and battery on a child less than fourteen years, 
second and subsequent offense, on November 7,1990. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1225 n.2. 
33. Id. at 1225. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. The six questions, as presented by Judge Borenstein, were: 
(1) Is the same probable cause to arrest standard, which is required to be 
reviewed by a judicial officer within twenty-four (24) hours after a person's 
detention, under Jenkins v. ChiefJustice of the Dist. Court, 619 N.E.2d 324, 337 
(Mass. 1993), also applicable when, pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 12(e), a peti­
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ment.37 Justice Ireland, sitting as a single justice of the SJC, 
ordered all appeals in the three defendants' cases, along with the six 
questions of law reported by Judge Borenstein, to be consolidated 
and transferred to the SJC for a full hearing.38 Mr. Davila and Mr. 
Wilson remain committed pending the outcome of the appeal to the 
SJC.39 
Ultimately, the SJC held that any person who committed a sex­
ual offense predating September 10, 1999 could be civilly confined 
under chapter 123A.40 In so doing, the court addressed several le­
gal issues raised both by the defendants and the courts sua sponte.41 
The article will discuss the following matters addressed by the SJC 
in Bruno: 1) retroactivity of chapter 123A,42 2) whether the statute 
tion is filed requesting an initial, temporary commitment of an alleged Sexu­
ally Dangerous Person (S.D.P.) pending the probable cause hearing? 
(2) Is the Commonwealth required to submit forensic evidence in support of 
the claim that the defendant has a mental abnormality or personality disorder 
as defined by G.L. c. 123A, § 1, at the time it files a petition under G.L. c. 
123A, § 12(e) for the initial, temporary commitment of an S.D.P. pending the 
probable cause hearing? 
(3) If the answer to question two (2) is no, must the Commonwealth provide 
forensic evidence in support of the claim that the defendant has a mental ab­
normality or personality disorder as defined by G.L. c. 123A, § 1, at any time 
before the probable cause hearing, in order to continue to temporarily commit 
a defendant pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 12(e)? 
(4) If the answer to question three (3) is no, pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 12( e), 
how long may a person be temporarily committed before a probable cause 
hearing is held? 
(5) Under G.L. c. 123A, § 13(a), must the Commonwealth present forensic 
evidence at the probable cause hearing in support of the claim that the defen­
dant has a mental abnormality or personality disorder, as defined by G.L. c. 
123A, § 1? 
(6) Should alleged sexually dangerous persons who are temporarily commit­
ted pending their probable cause hearmg, and/or after a finding of probable 
cause, be held separately from persons already adjudicated to be sexually dan­
gerous persons? 
Id. at 1226 n.5 (citations omitted). 
The Bruno court, when addressing these questions, applied its own interpretation. 
For the purpose of this article, the court's interpretation will be discussed, however, no 
analysis will be offered to determine whether the court properly answered Judge Bor­
enstein's original questions. 
37. Id. at 1226. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 1226. 
41. The Bruno court addressed the six questions posed by Judge Borenstein, none 
of which were raised by the three defendants. Id. at 1226 & n.5; see supra note 36 
(listing the six questions). 
42. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1229. 
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violates ex post facto law,43 3) whether the statute violates due pro­
cess,444) the defendant Bruno's claim of collateral estoppel,45 and 
5) the six questions of law reported by Judge Borenstein.46 
B. Legal Issues Addressed by the SIC in Bruno 
1. Retroactivity 
The defendants in Bruno claimed that applying chapter 123A 
to their case was unconstitutional because the statute was triggered 
by a conviction that occurred prior to the statute's effective date.47 
In essence, the defendants argued that chapter 123A may only ap­
ply to persons whose predicate offense occurred after September 
10, 1999.48 The SJC, however, held that the statute was not uncon­
stitutional because it operated prospectively.49 
The court stated that when "the conduct triggering the statute's 
application occurs on or after its effective date, the statute's appli­
cation is deemed prospective, and therefore permissible. "50 The 
court went on to state that chapter 123A was prospectively applied 
because "the conduct triggering the statute's application is not the 
prior conviction of a sexual offense, but the current mental condition 
of a defendant. "51 As such, the predicate sexual offense simply 
"limits the class of persons subject to potential commitment under 
chapter 123A."52 To support its notion that the predicate sexual 
offense is nothing more than a classification device, the SJC stated 
that: 
The legislature may, of course, choose to classify or reclassify a 
thing, and provided the new definition is applied only to deter­
mine status for the purpose of matters arising in the future, the 
prohibition on retroactive laws is not violated. A law is not made 
43. Id. at 1230. 
44. Id. at 1232. 
45. Id. at 1233-34. 
46. Id. at 1235. The six questions reported relate to: i) the standard of proof for a 
temporary confinement, ii) expert evidence at temporary commitment hearings, iii) the 
duration of temporary confinement absent expert evidence, iv) the duration of tempo­
rary commitment in general, v) expert evidence at probable cause hearings, and vi) 
segregation of persons committed from persons adjudged sexually dangerous. 
47. Id. at 1229. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. (citing McCarthy v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 322 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 
1975); Merch. Nat'l Bank v. Merch. Nat'l Bank of Boston, 62 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1945); 
McAndrews v. Fleet Bank of Mass., N.A., .989 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1993». 
51. Id. (emphasis added). 
52. Id. 
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retroactive because it alters the existing classification of a thing. 
Nor is a law retroactive if it draws upon antecedent facts for its 
operation.53 
Further, the court held that finding the statute prospective 
does not contradict the new consequence formulation of retroactiv­
ity as determined in Landgraf v. USI Film Products .54 In support of 
53. Id. (quoting EPA v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 F.2d 361, 365 (5th Cir. 
1987». 
54. Id. (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994». In Lan­
dgraf, the Court engaged in a detailed analysis of retroactive legislation. Beginning 
with a historical overview, the court stated that: 
[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our juris­
prudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. 
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an 
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; 
settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the 
"principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under 
the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal 
appeal." In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic 
endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence about the 
legal consequences of their actions. 
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66 (citations omitted). The Court then went on to state that 
it is "not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle fInds expression in several provi­
sions of our Constitution ... [and that] retroactive statutes raise particular concerns ... 
[because the] Legislature's unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expecta­
tions suddenly and without individualized consideration." Id. at 266. 
Once the Court gave an ample caveat of the dangers of applying legislation retro­
actively, it then offered a somewhat illusive defInition; In so doing, the Court pointed 
to Justice Story's defInition in Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 
756 (No. 13,156) (CC NH 1814), as one that should be viewed as influentiaL Landgraf, 
511 U.S. at 268. The Landgraf Court pointed out that Justice Story, in interpreting a 
provision of the New Hampshire Constitution, 
rejected the notion that the provision bars only explicitly retroactive legisla­
tion, ... [and that] [s]uch a construction ... would be "utterly subversive of all 
the objects" of the prohibition. Instead, the ban on retrospective legislation 
embraced "all statutes, which, though operating only from their passage, affect 
vested rights and past transactions." 
Id. at 268-69. 
Justice Story elaborated on his defInition of retroactive legislation by stating that 
"every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, 
or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect 
to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective ...." Id. 
at 269. 
Ultimately the Landgraf Court, elaborating on Justice Story's definition, concluded 
that: 
[A] statute does not operate "retrospectively" merely because it is applied in a 
case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expec­
tations based in prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provi­
sion attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its 
enactment. The conclusion that a particular rule operates "retroactively" 
comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of 
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this conclusion, the court stated: 
[I]nquiry is not simply a determination whether the new statutory 
provision effects an unanticipated consequence, but "a process of 
judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the 
law and the degree of connection between the operation of the 
new rule and a relevant past event." While "[a]ny test of retroac­
tivity will leave room for the disagreement in hard cases, and is 
unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal changes with 
perfect philosophical clarity," we are satisfied that the statute, 
with its focus on a person's current mental condition, does not 
operate retroactively.55 
2. 	 Whether the Statute Is an Unconstitutional Ex Post 
Facto Law 
The defendants argued that "various features of [chapter] 
123A render the statute punitive in both intent and effect and, thus, 
an unconstitutional ex post facto law under art. 24 of the Massachu­
setts Declaration of Rights. "56 The defendants pointed to three as­
pects of chapter 123A as being punitive: "(1) the commitment and 
treatment occurs after a sexually dangerous person has served his 
sentence; (2) the statute does not permit less restrictive alternatives 
to commitment; and (3) the treatment center is operated by the de­
partment" of corrections rather than the department of mental 
health.57 The court rejected the defendants' contentions, claiming 
the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of 
the new rule and a relevant past event. Any test of retroactivity will leave 
room for disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous 
variety of legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity. 
Id. at 269-70 (citation omitted). 
55. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1229-30 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 
244, 270 (1994) (holding that Civil Rights Act of 1999 did not apply retroactively to a 
case pending appeal when the statute was enacted as it attached new consequences not 
previously contemplated» (citations omitted). 
56. Id. at 1230. Article 24 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states that: 
"Laws made to punish for actions done before the existence of such laws, and which 
have not been declared crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive, and inconsis­
tent with the fundamental principles of a free government." MASS. CONST. part 1, art. 
XXIV. The defendants did not make an ex post facto argument under the Federal 
Constitution. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1230 n.9. They did argue, however, that the Massa­
chusetts Declaration of Rights provided them greater protection against ex post facto 
legislation than the Federal Constitution. Id. The Bruno court rejected the defendants' 
argument, stating that the courts in Massachusetts" 'have treated the ex post facto pro­
visions of the State and Federal Constitution in identical fashion.'" Id. (quoting Santi­
ago v. Commonwealth, 693 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Mass. 1998». 
57. 	 Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1230 n.9. Prior to the 1999 amendments, a person ad­
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that "the statute is neither punitive inintent or effect," nor is it an 
unconstitutiona~ ex post facto law.58 
In rejecting the defendants' ex post facto argument, the Bruno 
court found the analysis in Kansas v. Hendricks to be instructive. 59 
Under the guidance of Hendricks, the Bruno court first determined 
that only a criminal or civil statute with penal intent could consti­
tute an ex post facto law.60 Chapter 123A, a civil statute, could only 
be deemed penal if the defendants provided by "'the clearest proof' 
that 'the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect 
as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it 'civil"'61 The court 
concluded that the defendants in Bruno failed to meet that "high 
burden."62 
After concluding that chapter 123A did not have penal intent, 
the Bruno court determined that the Massachusetts Legislature in­
tended the statute to be remedial for several reasons.63 First, the 
legislature described the statute as an act establishing civil commit­
ment.64 Second, the statute's purpose is to civilly commit persons 
for their" 'care, custody, treatment and rehabilitation.' "65 Third, 
chapter 123A falls under a chapter of the general laws related to 
public welfare.66 Fourth, the legislature left intact the statute's title, 
"Care, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Sexually Dangerous Per­
sons."67 Fifth, the statute's dual goals are to "protect the public 
from sexually dangerous persons, and to provide [civilly confined 
persons with] treatment, and rehabilitation."68 
The Bruno court next determined that the defendants failed to 
show the "statute's scheme ... to be so punitive in purpose or effect 
judged as a sexually dangerous person, sentenced to serve time, served his criminal 
sentence and his civil commitment concurrently. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 1230-31. See supra note 27 for a detailed discussion of Kansas v. Hen­
dricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997). 
60. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1230. 
61. Id. (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 
U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980»). 
62. Id. 
63. See id. (citing Commonwealth v. Tate, 675 N.E.2d 772, 774 (Mass. 1997); In re 
Hill, 661 N.E.2d 1285, 1290-91 (Mass. 1997); Commonwealth v. Barboza, 438 N.E.2d 
1064, 1069 (Mass. 1982». 
64. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1231 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361). 
65. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 2 (2000». 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
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as to negate the Legislature's remedial intention."69 The court held 
that chapter 123A's purpose was not retributive, and that it did not 
function as a deterrent.7o The court afforded several justifications 
for these conclusions. First, the statute is "not retributive because 
'it does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct.'''71 Second, 
the statute is not retributive "because commitment is based on a 
person's current mental condition, and no finding of scienter is re­
quired to commit the person."72 Third, the court concluded that, 
"by the nature of their current mental condition, those persons 
committed under the statute are 'unlikely to be deterred by the 
threat of confinement.' "73 
Finally, in regard to the court's determination that chapter 
123A is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law, the court ad­
dressed the three portions of the statute considered by the oefend­
ants to be punitive.74 First, the defendants considered it punitive 
that the statute required a person to complete his or her criminal 
sentence prior to civil commitment.75 The Bruno court considered 
both sides of this issue. On the one hand, as stated in the Hendricks 
dissent, "the requirement of completion of a sentence prior to com­
mitment ... 'makes [the] legislative scheme ... look punitive."'76 
Conversely, however, a "State 'should be permitted to postpone 
treatment until after punishment in order to make certain that the 
punishment in fact occurs."'77 Ultimately, the Bruno court con­
cluded that it would not decide the question because the defendants 
did not raise the issue at trial.78 The Bruno court also noted that 
the "Supreme Court [in Hendricks] did not decide whether the Fed­
69. Id. at 1231 (citing Doe v. Attorney Gen. (No.2), 680 N.E.2d 97, 99 (Mass. 
1997)). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). To back this 
notion, the court reiterated that the statute's requirement of a "conviction of a sexual 
offense, is not the basis for commitment, but rather merely identifies and limits .the class 
of persons subject to commitment proceedings under c. 123A." Id. (quoting United 
States v. Usery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996)). Moreover, the court stated that the "fact that 
the [statute] may be 'tied to criminal activity' is 'insufficient to render [the statute] 
punitive.'" Id. (quoting Usery, 518 U.S. at 292), 
72. Id. 
73. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362-63); see also In re Hill, 661 N.E.2d 
1285,1291 (Mass. 1996) (stating that commitment "does not serve as [a] ... deterrent 
measure"). 
74. See id. 
75. Id. at 1231-32. 
76. Id. at 1231 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 386 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
77. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 386 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
78. See id. at 1232. 
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eral Constitution requires states to offer inmates sex offender treat­
ment while incarcerated for a subsequent civil commitment to be 
valid as non-punitive."79 As such, it would appear this unresolved 
issue could surface in future proceedings. 
Second, the defendants considered chapter 123A to be punitive 
because the statute fails to provide a less restrictive alternative to 
civil commitment.80 The court dismissed this argument, stating that 
persons committed under the statute "are likely to commit future 
harm," and as such, "confined commitment appears to be the only 
viable form of commitment. "81 
Finally, the court rejected the defendants' third argument that 
chapter 123A is punitive because treatment for committed persons 
is provided at "a treatment center operated under the auspices of 
the department of correction."82 The court did not offer details be­
yond stating that the SJC had rejected the same argument in Com­
monwealth v. Tate. 83 
3. Whether the Statute Violates Due Process 
The defendants' due process claim was as follows: 
The defendants argue thattemporary commitment of an indeter­
minate duration pending ,a probable cause hearing, pursuant to 
G.L. c. 123A, § 12(e), violates their substantive due process 
rights because the temporary restraint does not occur in narrowly 
circumscribed situations. They maintain that the temporary re­
straint is not imposed in narrowly circumscribed situations be­
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. In Commonwealth v. Tate, 675 N.E.2d 772, 774 (Mass. 1997), the peti­
tioner raised the argument that: 
[H]is commitment is penal in nature because it has been demonstrated that the 
treatment purposes of G.L. c. 123A cannot be realized. The defendant further 
relies on St. 1993, c. 489, which transferred control of the treatment center 
from the Department of Mental Health to the Department of Correction. He 
claims that, because his commitment to the treatment center was imposed 
without all the due process protections applicable to a criminal proceeding, 
and because his commitment is now solely penal, he has been denied due pro­
cess of law. 
Id. The Tate court, in rejecting the petitioner's argument, held that "the commitment 
statute has a remedial nonpunitive purpose." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Barboza, 438 
N.E.2d 1064, 1069 (Mass. 1982)). Moreover, the court held that "[t]he defendant's due 
process argument fails because he has not shown that the treatment center lacks contin­
ued viability as a place where sexually violent offenders can receive nonpunitive psychi­
atric treatment." Id. 
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cause the "district attorneys' discretion to initiate proceedings is 
not informed by meaningful guidelines; a district attorney can file 
a petition for commitment of any person who has been convicted 
of a single sex offense." The defendants also claim that this lack 
of guidelines violates their procedural due process rights.84 
The court rejected the defendants' contentions for the following 
reasons.85 
At the outset, the court determined the defendants' rights to 
be fundamental because they involved "freedom from physical re­
straint," and held that, as such, the "statute imposing the restraint 
may be upheld only if it is 'narrowly tailored to further a legitimate 
and compelling governmental interest.' "86 The court next claimed 
that the "defendants mistakenly arguer d] that under the statute, a 
district attorney may file a petition to commit anyone who has been 
convicted of a sexual offense."87 The court found the defendants' 
argument erroneous because a district attorney cannot file a peti­
tion to commit a person "unless it is 'likely' that the person pos­
sesses the requisite mental condition under the statute."88 The 
court went on to state that the District Attorney must consider nu­
merous statutory precautions before finding such a mental condi­
tion exists.89 
The court then held that the "lack of guidelines to district at­
torneys does not deprive the defendants of procedural due pro­
cess," because the "statute provides ample procedural protections 
84. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1232. 
85. See id. at 1232-33. 
86. Id. at 1232 (quoting Aime v. Commonwealth, 661 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Mass. 
1993». 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 1232-33 (discussing the following statutory provisions: (1) MASS. GEN. 
LAWS. ch. 123A, § 12(b), stating that the District Attorney's determination must be sup­
ported by "sufficient facts," and not merely averred; and (2) MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 
123A, § 12(e), listing that (a) a person cannot be temporarily committed under the 
statute merely by filing a petition, but rather the Commonwealth must make a "suffi­
cient showing" based on "evidence before the court," that the person named in the 
petition is sexually dangerous, and that the person is likely to commit future harm, (b) 
temporary commitment may only be sought when the person named in the petition is 
scheduled for release prior to the probable cause hearing, (c) if the court temporarily 
commits someone, the person is sent to a treatment center; the person does not remain 
incarcerated, and (d) the "person named in the petition may challenge the 'showing' 
and resulting temporary commitment. He 'may move the court for relief from such 
temporary commitment at any time prior to the probable cause determination."') (cita­
tions omitted). 
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to those subjected to potential commitment."9o Finally, the court 
supported the legitimacy <.?f the statute by holding that "preventing 
danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goaL "91 
4. Defendant Bruno's Collateral Estoppel Claim 
The defendant Bruno asserted that the "Commonwealth vio­
lated his due process rights because it initiated commitment pro­
ceedings against him after two psychiatrists [in 1985] had previously 
concluded that he was not sexually dangerous under a former ver­
sion of chapter 123A."92 Bruno relied primarily on Commonwealth 
v . .Travis, to support his argument.93 The court in Travis held that 
"'as a matter of fundamental fairness under the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a 
finding that an individual is no longer sexually dangerous must be 
as immune from subsequent or collateral attack as is a criminal 
judgment of acquittaL"'94 The SJC rejected Bruno's argument, 
stating that the Commonwealth was committing Bruno not only on 
his prior criminal history, but also because of his conduct that oc­
curred subsequent to the 1985 psychological evaluations.95 Because 
of the prospective assessment of his behavior, the court rejected 
Bruno's collateral estoppel claim and held that the Commonwealth 
was not precluded from initiating civil commitment proceedings 
against him.96 
90. Id. at 1233 (citing Aime v. Commonwealth, 611 N.E.2d 204,209 (Mass. 1993), 
which held that procedural due process "requires that' a statute or governmental action 
that has survived substantive due process scrutiny be implemented in a fair manner"). 
91. Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987». 
92. Id. at 1233-34. 
93. See id. at 1234. 
94. Commonwealth v. Travis, 361 N.E.2d 394, 401 (Mass. 1977). 
95. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1234. The subsequent conduct that the court referred to 
went beyond Bruno's prior criminal history, which included the rape conviction that 
constituted the predicate offense under chapter 123A. The court noted that, subse­
quent to the psychologist's reports: 
Bruno had refused to pursue sex offender therapy while incarcerated; Bruno's 
parole was twice revoked for testing positive for drugs; Bruno tested positive 
for Hepatitis B; and Bruno's parole was another time revoked for being ar­
rested for allegedly assaulting his girl friend with whom he lived, and for pos­
sessing a hypodermic needle. . 
Id. at 1234-35 (citation omitted). Thus, the court determined that the.issue "whether 
Bruno is currently a sexually dangerous person, is quite, different from whether he was 
sexually dangerous in 1985." Id. at 1235. 
96. Id. 
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5. The Six Questions of Law Reported by Judge Borenstein 
The court next addressed the six questions of law reported by 
Judge Borenstein: . 
a. Standard of Proof for a Temporary Commitment 
The first reported question addresses the standard of proof re­
quired to temporarily commit a person under chapter 123A, section 
12(e) of the Massachusetts General Laws.97 Section 12(e) instructs 
the court in what to do when a person, against whom the Common­
wealth previously filed a petition under section 12(b), is scheduled 
to be released from incarceration prior to the court's pr()bable 
cause determination under section 12(c).98 The statute simply 
states that the Commonwealth has to make a "sufficient showing," 
and the Bruno court had to determine the language's legislative 
meaning.99 The Commonwealth wanted the court to adopt the rea­
sonable suspicion standard,lOo or, in the alternative, a "special 
needs exception" to the probable cause standard.101 The court re­
jected the Commonwealth's request to adopt the reasonable suspi­
cion standard because "[t]hat standard justifies only a very brief 
detention quite different from the temporary, though vastly intru­
sive, detention permitted under G.L. c. 123A, § 12(e)."102 The 
court also rejected the Commonwealth's request to consider a "spe­
cial needs" exception to the probable cause requirement, as was 
done in McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Service, Inc. 103 Rather, 
97. Id. See infra Part III.E for a discussion of chapter 123A, section 12 of the 
Massachusetts General Laws. 
98. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 12(e) (2000). 
99. See Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1237. 
100. Id. at 1235. 
101. Id. at 1236. 
102. Id. at 1235. The court cited the following cases to show when the reasonable 
suspicion standard is appropriate. See Commonwealth v. Blais, 701 N.E.2d 314, 317 
(Mass. 1998) (officer with reasonable suspicion that person is operating vehicle while 
under influence may briefly detain person to administer field sobriety tests); Common­
wealth v. Barros, 682 N.E.2d 849,858 (Mass. 1997) (officer who detains person on rea­
sonable suspicion may detain for short period, fifteen minutes, to transport person for 
identification purposes); Commonwealth v. Salerno, 255 N.E.2d 318, 320-21 (Mass. 
1970) (officer who detains persons on reasonable suspicion may hold them for "expedi­
tious collateral inquiry which might result in the suspects' arrest or prompt release"). 
103. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1236 (citing McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv., 
Inc., 77 F.3d 540, 552 (1st Cir. 1996)). The Bruno court found the McCabe case to be 
distinguishable. In McCabe, 
a "special needs" exception permitted officers to enter without a warrant the 
home of a person for the purpose of detaining her pursuant to G.L. c. 123, 
§ 12(a), [chapter 123 addresses the hospitalization of mentally ill people who 
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the court held that probable cause under section 12 (e) is equivalent 
to the probable cause to arrest standard.104 
Though not a part of Judge Borenstein's reported questions, 
the Bruno court briefly addressed the probable cause standard 
under section 12( c) that the Commonwealth must meet in order to 
commit a person temporarily, up to sixty days for the purpose of 
evaluation under section 13.105 The court ultimately concluded that 
the section 12( c) hearing is similar to a bind-over hearing, which 
requires a directed verdict standard.l06 The court made this deter­
mination because the section 12(c) hearing and the bind-over hear­
ing are both adversarial in nature, the defendant has a right to 
counsel; the defendant has the right to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses, and the defendant may present witnesses on his 
or her own behalf.l07 A more detailed discussion of the distinction 
between these two probable cause standards will be addressed later 
in this article.l08 
b. Expert Evidence at Temporary Commitment Hearings 
The second question involved whether expert "eVidence is nec­
essary to temporarily commit a person under chapter 123A, section 
12( e) of the Massachusetts General Laws. The defendants argued 
that expert evidence is required, while the Commonwealth con­
tended that it could meet its burdeQ without su~h an offe~ng.l09 
are likely to harm themselves or others] after an impartial qualified physician 
determined her to be dangerous and mentally ill. The issue before the court 
was not the quantum of proof needed to justify depriving the woman of her 
liberty, but to justify the warrantless entry onto premises to attend to an emer­
gency situation. 
McCabe, 77 F.3d at 552. The Bruno court held that no such emergency or exigency 
existed in the instant case. 735 N.E.2d at 1236. 
104. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1237. 
105. Id. at 1236. 
106. Id. at 1237. The bind-over hearing that the Bruno court is referring to is 
held pursuant to chapter 276, section 38 of the Massachusetts General Laws, and is used 
to determine probable cause in lieu of an indictment. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, 
§ 38 (2000); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 3. The standard of proof required in a bind-over hearing 
(the directed verdict standard) "is more than that for probable cause to arrest but less 
than would 'prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Bruno, 735 
N.E.2d at 1236 (quoting People v. Bieber, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 821, 823 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 
1950». 
107. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1237; MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 12(c) (2000). 
108. See infra Part III.E for a discussion of section 12 of the Massachusetts Gen­
eral Laws. 
109. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1237. The Commonwealth specifically argued that in a 
123A proceeding, the burden on the defendant is similar to that in a criminal trial 
where the defendant is raising the insanity defense. In that situation, the Common­
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The court resolved this issue by examining the relevant probable 
cause standards in analogous legal situations.110 Ultimately, the 
court stated that: 
Because a temporary commitment will be sought in circum­
stances akin to an emergericy to hold a person for a short period 
until a probable cause hearing is held, the expert evidence re­
quired for a temporary commitment need not be in the form of 
live testimony, and need not be extensive, but it must establish 
probable cause as to those elements of proof.111 
c. Duration of Temporary Commitment Without Expert Evidence 
After deciding that expert testimony is crucial to any section 
12( e) temporary commitment proceeding, the court discussed one 
caveat. The court stated that if the Commonwealth failed to pro­
duce expert evidence, it could still hold the defendant for twenty­
four hours, so long as it could make an equivalent showing of prob­
able cause without the ex;pert testimony.uz The court also held that 
in such a situation the Commonwealth must represent to the presid­
ing judge that expert evidence existed and would be made available 
in short order.113 
d. Duration of Temporary Commitment in General 
In deciding the issue of the duration of temporary commitment 
under section 12( e) when expert evidence was available, the court 
looked to general principles of due process and fairness.1 14 In addi­
tion, the court noted that given the nature of the proceedings, coun­
sel on both sides will need adequate time in order to obtain relevant 
wealth can challenge the defendant's claims without the use of expert testimony. See 
Commonwealth v. Keita, 712 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Mass. 1999). The Bruno court rejected the 
Commonwealth's argument stating that in all criminal cases there is a presumption of 
sanity, and it ·is the defendant's burden to overcome the presumption and prove he or 
she is insane. In 123A proceedings, however, there is no presumption that the defen­
dant is sexually dangerous, thus, it stands to reason that the Commonwealth needs addi­
tional evidence to prove its case. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1237-38 
110. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1237-38. For example, the court looked at Common­
wealth v. Kirkpatrick, 668 N.E.2d 790, 797-98 (Mass. 1996), where the SJC reviewed the 
Commonwealth's need for expert testimony when attempting to explain to the jury the 
likelihood of a defendant transmitting a sexually communicable disease to the victim. 
111. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d. at 1238-39. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. See infra notes 135-38, 243-49 and accompanying text for a definition 
and discussion of "qualified examiner." 
114. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1238-39. 
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records and other material evidence not readily at hand.115 The 
court also noted that the court, and not an officer of the law, makes 
the determination whether to temporarily commit a person.116 
Ultimately, the court followed the example established by the 
temporary commitment procedures employed under Massachusetts 
General Laws, chapter 123A, and cases decided by other jurisdic­
tions. l17 The court determined that "absent unusual circumstances, 
a probable cause hearing should commence no later than ten busi­
ness days after a temporary commitment order is made under 
§ 12(e)".118 The court went on to state that "[w]e again note that 
the 'Commonwealth generally expects to be able to complete a 
probable cause hearing before an inmate's discharge date in future 
cases where it will have received the six-month advance notice of 
discharge ..."."'119 
e. Expert Evidence at Probable Cause Hearings 
Addressing the same concerns as it did in its discussion of the 
requirement of expert evidence at temporary commitment hearings 
under section 12(c), the court stated that the Commonwealth must 
present expert evidence at the defendant's probable cause 
hearing.120 
f Segregation of Persons Temporarily Committed 
The court addressed whether persons held pursuant to tempo­
rary commitment orders, and other temporary confinements under 
chapter 123A, have the right to be segregated from persons ad­
judged and committed as sexually dangerous.121 The court held 
that segregation is not necessary for a number of reasons. First, 
chapter 123A does not require this type of segregation.122 Second, 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1239. 
117. Id.; see also Ahem v. O'Donnell, 109 F.3d 809, 817 (1st Cir. 1997) (ten day 
commitment period); Luna v. Van Zandt, 554 F. Supp. 68, 71 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (fourteen 
day commitment period); Bension v. Meredith, 455 F. Supp. 662, 669 (D.D.C. 1978) 
(commitment period not to exceed thirty days); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 
515 (D. Neb. 1975) (commitment period not to exceed sixty days). 
118. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1239; see infra note 183 and accompanying text (dis­
cussing section 12). 
119. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1239. 
120. Id. See supra Part H.B.5.b for a discussion of the second question reported 
by Judge Borenstein. 
121. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1239. 
122. The Bruno court noted that in Wilson, one of the consolidated cases in 
Bruno, Judge Borenstein determined that persons civilly confined under 123A, sections 
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there is already a plan in place in which "the superintendent of the 
treatment center has promulgated rules and regulations regarding 
persons temporarily committed consistent with a management plan 
for the facility as a whole that comports with constitutional require­
ments as determined by the United States District Court."123 Third, 
management of the treatment center is under the discretion of the 
Commissioner of Correction, and "[t]here has been no showing that 
he has abused that discretion in holding those temporarily commit­
ted [under chapter 123A] in accordance with rules and regula­
tions."124 Finally, the Bruno court stated, the defendants did not 
make a "showing that the manner and conditions under which those 
temporarily committed or held are unconstitutional."125 
III. ROAD MAP OF MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS 

CHAPTER 123A 

A. Section 1-Definitions 
As a first step in examining chapter 123A of the Massachusetts 
General Laws, this article will review the definitions found in sec­
tion 1 of the statute.126 A "sexually dangerous person" is defined in 
section 1 as: 
[A]ny person who has been (i) convicted of or adjudicated as a 
delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by reason of a sexual 
offense and who suffer~ from a mental abnormality or personal­
ity disorder which makes the person likely to engage in sexual 
offenses if not cOhfined to a secure facility; (ii) charged with a 
sexual offense a~d w~s determined to be incompetent to stand 
12(e) and 13(a), must be held separately from those adjudged sexually dangerous. Id. 
Wilson was to be "held apart from persons adjudged sexually dangerous." Id. The 
Bruno court, however, concluded that the "judge found no facts to support his segrega­
tion order, and the record is sparse on the matter." Id. The court went on to state that 
it appears that Judge Borenstein's order was based on requirements in chapter 123A, 
section 35 "that an alcoholic who is committed thereunder must be 'housed and treated 
separately from convicted criminals.'" Id. at 1240. Judge Borenstein also relied on "a 
requirement that pretrial detainees at the Suffolk County Jail be housed in conditions 
'superior' to those of inmates under sentence." Id.; see Inmates of the Suffolk County 
Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 686 (D. Mass. 1973), affd 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 
1974). Ultimately, the Bruno court held that the record Judge Borenstein based his 
segregation order on was "inadequate" and did not permit the court "to give a reasoned 
and intelligent answer to the question reported." Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1240. 
123. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1240 (citing King v. Greenblatt, 53 F. Supp. 2d 117, 
134-37 (D. Mass. 1999». 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (2000). 
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trial and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder which makes such person likely to engage in sexual of­
fenses if not confined to a secure facility; or (iii) previously adju­
dicated as such by a court of the commonwealth and whose 
misconduct in sexual matters indicates a general lack of power to 
control his sexual impulses.127 
"Mental abnormality" is defined as "a congenital or acquired 
condition of a person that affects the emotional or volitional capac­
ity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person to the 
commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the per­
son a menace to the health and safety of other persons."128 The 
statute's definition of mental abnormality does not include all 
mental conditions or tendencies but, rather, only those that mani­
fest themselves in some way that enables or contributes to a per­
son's commission of dangerous sexual offenses. Similarly, the 
section's definition of "personality disorder" only includes "a con­
genital or acquired physical or mental condition that results in a 
general lack of power to control sexual impulses."129 Neither defini­
tion lists any specific disorders or abnormalities and could be inter­
preted to include any broad range of conditions whether or not they 
are currently recognized in the appropriate scientific field.13° 
127. [d. (emphasis added). 
128. [d. 
129. [d. 
130, In Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), the 
California Superior Court held that in order to commit a person for being sexually 
dangerous, the state must prove that he or she suffers from a "mental disorder" sup­
ported by a diagnosis conforming to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association. [d. at 290. The court stated that 
the "term 'mental disorder' is not an amorphous concept [but rather] ... [d]iagnoses of 
'mental disorders' are made pursuant to the [DSM-IV] ... [and have] a demonstrably 
established technical meaning." [d. Subsequently, the California Supreme Court, in 
reviewing the Superior Court's decision, noted that "commitment as a SVP [sexually 
violent predator] cannot occur unless it is proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
person currently suffers from a clinically diagnosed mental disorder." Hubbart v. Sure­
rior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 593 n.20 (Cal. 1999). 
In contrast, an Illinois court defined the term mental disorder broadly, holding that 
a defendant could be diagnosed by several means, including by an evaluation of the 
defendant's criminal history. People v. Cole, 701 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
The court stated: 
[The] "mental disorder" requirement is not rendered superfluous because a 
pattern of criminal behavior is the sole support for the diagnosis .... The 
"mental disorder" requirement may be satisfied by a number of means .... A 
qualified psychiatrist could diagnose a "mental disorder" based on an inter­
view, standardized testing, a physical test ... or some combination of these 
indicators. In short, because the "mental disorder" element may be estab­
lished by means other than criminal conduct, the fact that it is established by a 
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Section 1 also defines what constitutes a "sexual offense" and 
lists a number of crimes that subject a defendant to chapter 123A 
proceedings. l3l The crimes listed are all sexual crimes against per­
sons, and crimes that are defined as attempts to commit those sex­
ual crimes.132 
Another important definition is that of "qualified exam­
iner."133 As this article will discuss later, the qualified examiner 
pattern of criminal conduct in this case does not render the requirement a 
nullity. 
[d. 
The approach in Cole, appears to be both circular and an ex post facto violation, as 
the criminal convictions can be used as evidence of the sexual offense, the mental disor­
der, and the likelihood of recidivism. In other words a criminal conviction could be the 
only evidence that the state needs to commit a defendant charged as a sexually danger­
ous person. 
131. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (2000). 
132. The pertinent part of section 1 reads: 
"Sexual offense" includes any of the following crimes: indecent assault and 
battery on a child under fourteen ... ; indecent assault and battery on a men­
tally retarded person ... ; indecent assault and battery on a person who has 
obtained the age of fourteen ... ; rape. .. ; rape of a child under sixteen with 
force ... ; rape and abuse of a child under sixteen ... ; assault with intent to 
commit rape ... ; assault on a child with intent to commit rape ... ; drugging 
persons for sexual intercourse ... ; unnatural and lascivious acts with a child 
under the age of sixteen ... ; and any attempt to commit any of the above 
listed crimes . 
Id. 
133. Section 1 defines qualified examiner as: 
[A] physician who is licensed ... [and] who is either certified in psychiatry by 
the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology or eligible to be so certified, 
or a psychologist who is licensed ... ; provided, however, that the examiner 
has had two years of experience with diagnosis or treatment of sexually ag­
gressive offenders and is designated by the commissioner of correction. A 
"qualified examiner" need not be an employee of the department of correc­
tion or of any facility or institution of the department. 
Id.; CPCS, supra note 7. CPCS's web site lists the following additional criteria estab­
lished by the Department of Correction: 
• Be 	a member of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers 
(ATSA) and/or the Massachusetts Association for the Treatment of Sexual 
Abusers (MATSA) or other organization that promotes research and the 
study of the treatment and assessment of sex offenders; 
• Attend ten hours per year of sex offender training four hours of which are 
in assessment of sexual offenders; 
• Any qualified examiner who is appointed by the vendor to conduct an eval­
uation of a person's present sexual dangerousness, and who renders an opin­
ion that the person is presently an SDP is prohibited from subsequently 
being retained by that person or that person's attorney to conduct a future 
evaluation of that same person's sexual dangerousness; and 
• 	If a qualified examiner was previously retained by a person or that person's 
attorney to render an opinion on that person's sexual dangerousness, the 
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plays an integral part in the process of determining whether a de­
fendant is to be considered a sexually dangerous person. 134 Be­
cause the defendant's liberty depends on the jury or court's finding 
of dangerousness, which is based largely on the defendant's state of 
mind, the opinion of the examiner is crucial. Any licensed or certi­
fied psychiatrist or psychologist is permitted to be a qualified exam­
iner.135 However, an examiner must have a minimum of two years 
of experience treating or diagnosing sexually aggressive offenders, 
and the Commissioner of Correction must designate him or her as a 
qualified examiner.!36 While the qualified examiner need not be an 
employee of the Department of Correction, the Commissioner of 
Correction must still designate him or her as an examiner.!37 This 
restriction is significant. In situations where the defendant is 
granted the opportunity to obtain an independent examination for 
use at a hearing, his or her examiner must also be qualified under 
this definition.138 This requirement appears to limit the ability of a 
defendant to obtain a truly independent examiner, or one tl)at ad­
vances a novel theory on the issue of mental disorders and defining 
what the term sexually dangerous person means.139 Section 1 also 
defines "agency with jurisdiction,"14o "community access board,"141 
vendor may not appoint that same qualified examiner to conduct future 
evaluation of that same person. 
Id. CPCS's web site also lists qualified examiners who have been approved by the 
Department of Correction as of December 19, 2000. It is interesting to note that as of 
that date, the department had only approved of twenty-one qualified examiners. This 
could possibly explain some of the delays that are discussed throughout this article. 
134. See infra Part III.F. 
135. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (2000). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 13(d) (2000). "Any person subject to exami­
nation pursuant to the provisions of this section may retain a psychologist or psychia­
trist who meets the requirements of a qualified examiner, as defined in section 1, to 
perform an examination on his behalf." Id. 
139. See infra notes 243-49 and accompanying text. 
140. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (2000). Section 1 defines "agency with juris­
diction" 	as: 
the agency with the authority to direct the release of a person presently incar­
cerated, confined or committed to the department of youth services including, 
but not limited to a sheriff, keeper, master or superintendent of a jail, house of 
correction or prison, the director of a custodial facility in the department of 
youth services, the parole board and, where a person has been found incompe­
tent to stand trial, a district attorney. 
fr!. 
141. Id. (defining "community access board" as "a board consisting of five mem­
bers appointed by the commissioner of correction, whose function shall be to consider a 
26 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1 
and "community access program."142 
B. Section 2-Nemansket Correctional Center 
Section 2143 establishes that the Department ofCorrection and 
the Commissioner of Correction shall maintain jurisdiction over the 
"Nemansket Correctional Center,"144 a correctional institution for 
the care, custody, treatment, and rehabilitation of persons adjudi­
cated as sexually dangerous.145 The Commissioner of Correction 
has the authority to appoint the chief administrative officer at the 
Nemansket Correctional Center146 and to promulgate regulations 
for the management of the Center.147 
Under section 2A,148 a civilly committed individual sentenced 
for·a criminal offense whose sentence has not yet expired may, at 
the Commissioner of Correction's discretion, be transferred from 
the treatment center to another correctional institution designated 
by the commissioner.149 In making his or her determination, the 
Commissioner of Correction must consider several factors, in order 
to provide the individual with due process.150 
person's placement within a community access program and conduct an annual review 
of a person's sexual dangerousness"). 
142. Id. (defining "community access program" as "a program established pursu­
ant to section six A that provides for a person's reintegration into the community"). 
143. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 2 (2000). 
144. The Nemansket Correctional Center, also known as the treatment center, is 
actually associated with the state psychiatric facility in Bridgewater. There is a recent 
push to have the name of this center changed. See H.R. 136, 182d Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. 
(Mass. 2001); H.R. 137, 182d Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2001). 
145. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 2 (2000). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. See generally King v. Greenblatt, 127 F.3d 190 (1st Cir. 1997). The De­
partment of Correction's regulations are found in title 103 of the Code of Massachusetts 
Regulations. Some of these regulations include the governance of inmate wages and 
stipends, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 103, § 405.07 (1999), disciplinary process for sanc­
tioned reimbursements from inmate funds, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 103, § 405.17 (1999), 
court assessments and other authorized assessments of inmate funds, MASS. REGS. 
CODE tit. 103, § 405.18 (1999), rules regarding the transfer of sexually dangerous per­
sons, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 103, § 460.01 (1997), and furlough. eligibility, MASS. REGS. 
CODE tit. 103, § 463.07 (1997). Other agencies have promulgated regulations that im­
pact sexually dangerous persons. For example, the Parole Board has regulated eligibil­
ity for parole, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 120, § 301.01 (1997), and the Criminal History 
Systems Board has regulated the registration of certain sexual offenders, MASS. REGS. 
CODE tit. 803, § 1.40 (2001). 
148. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 2A (2000). 
149. Id. 
150. [d. The commissioner of corrections may consider the following factors: 
(1) the person's unamenability to treatment; (2) the person's unwillingness or 
failure to follow treatment recommendations; (3) the person's lack of progress 
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C. Section 6A -Commitment Security and Community Access 
Section 6A151 gives the Department of Correction the duty of 
determining and applying the most appropriate level of security 
when it comes to housing and treating persons adjudicated as sexu­
ally dangerous.152 The department, when making this determina­
tion, must consicier the safety of the public and correctional staff, as 
well as the safety of the inmates themselves.153 Most notably, this 
section mandates that all juvenile inmates be separated from adult 
inmates. I54 
Section 6A also establishes a community access program by 
which persons adjudicated as sexually dangerous may have limited 
interactions with the rest of society as part of his or her treat­
ment. I55 An inmate may apply once a year to be considered for this 
program as long as he or she is not currently subject to any criminal 
sentence.I56 The community access board, consisting of both em­
ployees of the Department of Correction and non-employees, 
makes eligibility determinations. I57 If an inmate is released to this 
in treatment at the center or branch thereof; (4) the danger posed by the per­
son to other residents or staff at the Treatment Center or branch thereof; (5) 
the degree of security necessary to protect the public. 
The department of correction shall promulgate regulations establishing a 
transfer board and procedures governing transfer, including notification of 
hearing, opportunity to be heard, written decision notification of decision, op­
portunity for appeal, and periodic review of placement. 
Id. 
151. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 6A (2000). 
152. [d. 
153. Id. It should be again noted that in Commonwealth v. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d 
1232 (Mass. 2000), the SJC held that there is no requirement that temporarily commit­
ted persons, under sections 12(e) and 13, be segregated from formally committed sexu­
ally dangerous persons. The court reasoned that the Department of Correction's 
management of the treatment center "as a whole comports with constitutional require­
ments as determined by the United States District Court." [d.; see King v. Greenblatt, 
53 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134-37 (D. Mass. 1999). 
154. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 6A (2000). 
155. [d. 
156. [d. Section 6A states that "[o]nly a person whose criminal sentence has ex­
pired or upon whom a criminal sentence was never imposed shall be entitled to apply 
for participation in a community access program." [d. This is most likely a moot point 
since a civil commitment under chapter 123A usually takes place after an inmate com­
pletes his or her sentence. 
157. /d. (allowing the board to consist of "five members appointed by the com­
missioner of correction . . .. Membership shall include three department of correction 
employees and two persons who are not department of correction employees, but who 
may be independent contractors or consultants. The non-employee members shall con­
sist of psychiatrists or psychologists licensed by the commonwealth"). This statute ap­
pears to limit the true independence of a licensed, non-department of correction 
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program, he or she is subjected to daily evaluations to determine 
whether he or she is a danger to the community. Additionally, he or 
she must continue to reside within the confines of the treatment 
center, and the board must provide notice to the state police and to 
the Attorney General's office, as well as to the victim and the vic­
tim's family.158 The board must also notify the police and the Dis­
trict Attorney's office in both the district where the crime occurred, 
and the district where the inmate will be employed under the com­
munity access program,l59 
D. Section 9-Petitions for Examination and Discharge 
Section 9 affords a person committed as a sexually dangerous 
person the right to petition for his or her discharge once every 
year.160 A spouse, child, next of kin, or any friend may also file a 
petition on behalf of the committed person.161 Upon the filing of 
the petition, the committed person is entitled to a hearing in the 
superior court to determine whether he or she is still sexually 
dangerous.162 
It is difficult to classify the section 9 hearing as either a crimi­
nal or civil proceeding. The person appears to be entitled to have 
the issue determined by a jury at a hearing held "according to the 
practice of trial in civil cases in the superior court."163 Additionally, 
section 9 does not expressly provide for a unanimous jury decision 
as does section 14, which provides that a jury must make a unani­
mous decision as to whether a person is sexually dangerous.164 On 
employee appointed to the board. The concern is that the department of corrections 
may employ psychiatrists and psychologists as consultants and independent contractors, 
and retain some influence over these doctors. At the very least, it may have some effect 
on the number of non-department of corrections qualified examiners available to a de­
fendant faced with a sexually dangerous person hearing. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. The board must also notify the police department of the town of Bridge­
water as participants in this program must continue to reside at the Bridgewater treat­
ment facility. Id. 
160. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 9 (2000). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. Prior to 1993, section 9 did not include language that granted a defen­
dant the right to a jury trial. This right was added when the statute was amended by 
1993 Mass. Acts ch. 489, § 7, approved January 14, 1994. This was also the rule estab­
lished by In re Gagnon, 625 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Mass. 1994), a case decided on the earlier 
version of section 9. More recent case law, which interprets the revised section 9, still 
limits the defendant's right to a jury trial. For example, the SJC held that there is no 
constitutional right to a jury trial in proceedings governing sexually dangerous persons, 
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the other hand, at a trial under section 9, the Commonwealth must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the inmate continues to re­
main sexually dangerous.165 
E. Section 12-ludicial Classification As Sexually Dangerous 
Although one of the later sections of chapter 123A, section 12 
is really the starting point in determining whether a person is first 
subjected to any court or jury's determination that he or she may be 
considered sexually dangerous.166 Under the authority of section 
12, an agency that has jurisdiction or control over a person con­
victed of an offense that falls under chapter 123A must give six 
months notice to the Attorney General and District Attorney of the 
county in which the offense occurred that the person is to be re­
leased from custody.167 Section 12 also gives the agency the respon­
sibility of identifying certain inmates that have a "particularly high 
likelihood of meeting the criteria for a sexually dangerous per­
son."168 Once the Attorney General and District Attorney receive 
notice from the appropriate agency, he or she can determine 
whether the prisoner is likely to be a sexually dangerous person.169 
If either the Attorney General or the District Attorney believes 
that the person is sexually dangerous, he or she. may file a commit­
ment petition with the superior court of the county in which the 
offense occurred.170 
After the petition is filed, the court must determine whether 
there is probable cause to believe the person is, in fact, sexually 
dangerous.l71 It is only after the court finds that probable cause 
and that an agreement of five-sixths of jurors did not violate due process given the 
language of the statute. In re Sheridan, 665 N.E.2d 978, 981 (Mass. 1996). 
165. See In re Wyatt, 701 N.E.2d 337, 346 (Mass. 1998). With respect to jury 
instructions, the Wyatt court held that while the court properly instructed that the de­
fendant who brought a section 9 hearing was presumed not to be a sexually dangerous 
person, such an instruction is not constitutionally required under this section. Id. The 
court also held that instructions for section 9 hearings could ask the jury to consider 
either whether the defendant "is" sexually dangerous or whether the defendant "re­
mains" sexually dangerous because the jury could not conclude that the defendant "re­
mains" sexually dangerous unless he or she "is" sexually dangerous. Id. at 342-43. 
166. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 12 (2000); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
123A, §§ 3-4 (repealed 1990) (replaced by section 12). 
167. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 12(a) (2000). Under the statute, in the event 
that a person is sentenced to a term of no more than six months incarceration as a result 
of a parole revocation, the agency shall give notice as soon as practicable. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 12(b) (2000). 
170. Id. For a sample petition, see MCLE, INC., supra note 6. 
171. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 12(c) (2000). 
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exists under section 12(c) that it can hold the defendant for up to 
sixty days for an evaluation.l72 In order to make this determina­
tion, the court must hold a hearing in accordance with section 12(c), 
which entitles the person to notice and the right to appear.173 At 
this hearing, the defendant is also afforded the right to: (1) be rep­
resented by counsel; (2) present evidence on his or her behalf; (3) 
cross-examine witnesses who testify against them; and (4) view and 
copy all petitions and reports in the court file. 174 If the person is 
scheduled to be released while the petition is pending and prior to 
the section 12( c) probable cause hearing, the court may tempor~­
rily commit ~heperson tO,the tr~atment center, absent any unusual 
circumstances, for a period of ten business daysPS 
This section of the statute raises an important question; what 
amounts to probable, cause to hold a defendant under section 12(c) 
for the purpose of evaluation. The SJC ruled that "the Common­
wealth's burden of proof attheo probable, cause hearing under 
§ 12(c) is the same as that required for a probable cause, or bind­
over, hearing held pursuant to [chapter 276, section' 38 of the Gen­
eral Laws of Massachusetts]'''176 This standard is also referred to as 
the directed verdict standard, as the defendant has been afforded 
several, statut<;>,ry rights,: including the right to counsel and to pre­-.. . 
sent evidence. l77 It is only after the court has determined that the 
172. Id. § 13(a). 
173. Id. § 12(c). 
174. Id. § 12( d). 
175. Id. § 12(e); see Commonwealth Y. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d 1222, 1237 (Mass. 
2000) (holding a person may be temporarily committed as a sexually dangerous person 
absent unusual circumstances for no more than ten business days pending commence­
ment of the probable cause hearing). This extension of time for unusual circumstances 
is different from the strict time requirements of section 13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, 
§ 13 (2000) (setting express time limits on temporary commitment for the purposes of 
examinations). Section 12 does not contain any express time limits, and the ten-day 
period is prescribed by the Bruno case. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 12 (2000); 
Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1239. But see Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 762 N.E.2d 794, 796-97 
(Mass. 2001) (concluding that the time requirements of section 13 must be strictly en­
forced by the courts, despite anything to the contrary in section 12 and the court's hold­
ing in Bruno). 
176. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1236. See supra Part II.B.5.a for a discussion of the 
first question posed by Judge Borenstein, "[t]he standard of proof needed for tempo­
rary confinement." 
177. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1237. In Bruno, the court rejected the Common­
wealth's argument that the probable cause to arrest standard should apply because the 
hearing was merely a preliminary proceeding. Id. The Commonwealth also attempted 
to analogize the section 12(c) hearing to a parole hearing, at which the probable cause 
to arrest standard is used. The court stated that the two hearings were "vastly differ­
ent." Id. 
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Commonwealth has met its probable cause burden that it can order 
that· a defendant be temporarily committed for up to sixty days for 
evaluation.178 
The above probable cause standard must be distinguished from 
a second and distinct probable cause standard that might come into 
play in the application of section 12(c).179 In certain situations, the 
Commonwealth may seek to temporarily commit the defendant 
while awaiting the probable cause determination that results from a 
section 12(c) hearing.180 Under section 12(e), the Commonwealth 
must demonstrate that there is probable cause to arrest in order to 
have a person temporarily committed pending a section 12(c) hear~ 
ing.181 In order to meet this burden and temporarily commit a per­
son for up to ten days, the Commonwealth must present some 
expert evidence, although this evidence need not be extensive or in 
the form of live testimony, and needs to establish probable cause to 
arrest.182 . In a situation where the Commonwealth has. not 
The directed verdict standard, as defined in Myers v. Commonwealth, requires: (1) 
more evidence than probable cause for arrest but less than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt; (2) the fact finder to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the quality of the 
evidence introduced; (3) "the examining magistrate [to] view the case as if it were a trial 
and he were required to rule on whether there is enough credible evidence to send the 
case to the jury." (298 N.E.2d 819, 822-25 (Mass. 1973». 
178. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 13 (2000). 
179. See Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1237-38. The following cases are examples of situ­
ations where a superior court judge, upon an examination of the evidence at a section 
12(c) hearing, found no probable cause that a person was sexually dangerous. In these 
examples, the judges· go into detail about the relevant scientific data and literature that 
is used in determining whether a person is classified as sexually dangerous. See Com­
monwealth v. Reese, No. 00-0181-B, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 112 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Apr. 5,2001); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, No. 00-0122-A, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
133 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2001); Commonwealth v. Toland, No. A. 00:.Q331-B, 2000 
Mass. Super. LEXIS 137 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2000). 
In Commonwealth v. Breland, the court denied the Commonwealth's motion for 
temporary commitment under section 12(e), pending the defendant's probable cause 
hearing. The court required the Commonwealth to meet a burden of "sufficient show­
ing" that was "less than a showing of probable cause;" however, the court stated that, 
regardless of the standard that needed to be applied, the Commonwealth failed to pre­
sent any evidence that the defendant had a mental abnormality or personality disorder. 
No. 00-1222, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 363 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 11,2000). 
180. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 12(e) (2000). Such a situation could arise if, 
for whatever reason, the defendant is released from Department of Correction custody 
before the court can hold the section 12(c) probable cause hearing. Similarly, a person 
could be released from the department's custody during a lengthy section 12(c) proba­
ble cause hearing. 
181. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1237. Again, this is a different probable cause stan­
dard from the one to be applied by the court at the actual section 12( c) hearing. See 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 12 (e) (2000). 
182. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1238. A superior court judge denied the Common­
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presented any expert evidence, a person may still be held for 
twenty-four hours, provided there is evidence that satisfies the bur­
den and the required expert evidence is forthcoming.183 Again, the 
two probable cause standards should not be confused; the Com­
monwealth has a greater burden in showing probable cause to tem~ 
porarily commit a person for the sixty day evaluation than it does 
with respect to showing probable cause to temporarily. commit a 
person for ten days pending the more important probable cause 
hearing. l84 
F. Section 13-Temporary Commitment 
If the court determines that probable cause exists to believe 
that a person is sexually dangerous, the court shall then commit the 
person to the treatment center for the purpose of being evaluated 
by qualified medical examiners.185 Section 13(a) sets forth the stat­
ute's strict time requirements, mandating that the period of com­
mitment shall not exceed sixty days,and the actual examination 
must occur no later than fift~en days prior to the expiration of the 
commitment period.186 Two examiners must then file a report 
based on the examination and other relevant evidence that offers a 
diagnosis of the defendant, as well as the examiners' recommenda­
tion as to the defendant's status, as a sexually dangerous person.187 
wealth's use of expert testimony where the expert interviewed the defendant without 
the knowledge or approval of the defendant's counsel in violation of Rule 4.2 of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. See Commonwealth v. Louhisdon, No. 
A 01-201-B, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 111 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 2001). 
183. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1238. The court appeared to explain this distinction by 
pointing out that, in other situations, a police office could make a decision to hold a 
person for a brief period of time such as twenty-four hours if the office believed there 
was probable cause, but a longer period of confinement would require a neutral magis­
trate's, or judge's, finding of probable cause. /d. at 1239; see also supra Part II (discuss­
ing Bruno at length). 
184. Another way of putting it could be that the Commonwealth, if it is attempt­
ing to temporarily commit a person pending a 12(c) hearing, must show that sufficient 
probable cause exists such that a court will find, after a hearing, that there is probable 
cause that the person is sexually dangerous and should be temporarily committed for 
evaluation. Because the first finding of probable cause is a further step removed from 
the second and ultimate finding of probable cause, the first finding imposes a lesser 
burden on the Commonwealth, that of probable cause to arrest, as opposed to the sec­
ond finding's greater directed verdict burden. 
185. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 13 (2000). Again, it should be noted that 
persons temporarily committed to the treatment center under this statute are not enti­
tled to segregation from those already found to be sexually dangerous. 
186. Id. § 13(a). 
187. Id. As a practical matter, the defendant may choose not to cooperate with a 
proper examination. The statute does not require that the written report of the examin­
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It is important to note that the time requirements found in sec­
tion 13 do not appear to be flexible. Other sections of chapter 
123A provide time frames that may be extended for "good cause 
shown" or on the court's own motion if "the interests of justice so 
require, unless the person named in the petition will be substan­
tially prejudiced thereby."188 At least one superior court justice has 
concluded that courts must strictly enforce the section 13 time re­
quirements because, unlike other provisions of the statute, there is 
no express authority for an extension of time.189 The superior court 
justice further concluded that dismissal of the petition and release 
of the defendant is the most appropriate remedy in a situation in 
which section 13 requirements are not followed.190 
As is the case for a hearing under section 12( e), a defendant is 
ers be based on an examination, and it follows that the examiners could render their 
opinion on other facts present, noting that the defendant was not amenable to an exam­
ination. Id. Section 13(b) states: 
The court shall supply to the qualified examiners copies of any juvenile and 
adult court records which shall contain, if available, a history of previous juve­
nile and adult offenses, previous psychiatric and psychological examinations 
and such other information as may be pertinent or helpful to the examiners in 
making the diagnosis and recommendation. The District Attorney or the At­
torney General shall provide a narrative or police reports for each sexual of­
fence[sic] conviction or adjudication as well as any psychiatric, psychological, 
medical or social worker records of the person named in the petition in the 
District Attorney's or the Attorney General's possession. The agency with 
jurisdiction over the person named in the petition shall provide such examin­
ers with copies of any incident reports arising out of the person's incarceration 
or custody. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 13(b) (2000). 
188. Id. § 14(a); see Bruno, 735 N.E.2d at 1239 (allowing an extension of ten-day 
temporary commitment period under section 12( e) for "unusual circumstances"). 
189. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, Civ. No. 00-171 (Hampden County Super. 
Ct., June 29, 2001) (Velis, J.) (referring to other provisions of chapter 123A of the Mas­
sachusetts General Laws and a defendant's right to a speedy trial under the Massachu­
setts Rules of Criminal Procedure), affd, 762 N.E.2d 764 (Mass. 2001). 
190. Id. In arriving at this conclusion, Judge Velis first looked to Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (analyzing a violation of a defendant's speedy trial 
rights, the Court held that all relevant factors must be weighed, and "any inquiry into a 
speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context 
of the case"). . 
Judge Velis then followed the Supreme Judicial Court's analysis and remedy in 
Hashimi v. Kalil, 446 N.E.2d 1387 (Mass. 1983), a case that dealt with a civil commit­
ment under chapter 123 of the Massachusetts General Laws. In Hashimi, the court 
found that the civil commitment statute included express language mandating that a 
"hearing shall be commenced within fourteen days ...." Id. at 1389. The court then 
stated that such language is plain and unambiguous, and that a violation of the statute 
warranted the dismissal of the commitment petition despite the absence of both specific 
language requiring dismissal and a showing of prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 1388­
89.. 
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entitled to counsel under section 13(c), and if he or she cannot af­
ford an attorney, the court shall appoint one.191 The defendant's 
counsel, as well as the District Attorney and Attorney General, is 
entitled to the qualified examiners' reports as well as all written 
documentation that was provided to the qualified examiners.192 
The defendant also is entitled to retain ali independent qualified 
examiner to perform an examination on his or her behalf, and if the 
defendant is indigent, the court shall provide funds for such a quali­
fied examiner.193 
G. Section 14-Trial by Jury 
Within fourteen days of receipt of the qualified examiners' re­
port, the District Attorney or the Attorney General may petition 
the court for a jury trial to determine the, ultimate question of 
whether the defendant is a sexually dangerous person.194 Unlike 
section 9, section 14 does not expressly state whether civil or crimi­
nal trial practice governs.195 Section 14(b) entitles the defendant to 
counsel and the ability to retain experts, and provides that the court 
Will allocate funds and assistance in obtaining experts for indigent 
persons:196 At the trial,almost all relevant evidence is admissi­
ble.197 The defendant is entitled to have this trial commence within 
sixty days of the District Attorney or. Attorney General's petition 
for a trial.198 
191. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 13(c) (2000). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. § 13( d). 
194. Id. § 14(a). 
195. Id. Compare id. § 9 with id. § 14. 
196. Id. § 14(b). Any reports of the defendant's experts must be filed with the 
court and. provided to the District Attorney or Attorney General ten days prior to trial. 
Id. 
197. Id. § 14(c). Section 14(c) reads in pertinent part: 

Juvenile and adult court probation records, psychiatric and psychological 

records and reports of the person named in the petition, including the report 

of any qualified examiner, as· defined in section 1, and filed under this chapter, 

police reports relating to such person's prior sexual offenses, incident reports 

arising out of such person's incarceration or custody, oral or written state- . 

ments prepared for and to be offered at the trial by the victims of the person 

who is the subject of the petition and any other evidence tending to show that 

such person is or is not a sexually dangerous person shall be admissible at the 

trial if such written information has been provided to opposing counsel rea­

sonably in advance of trial. . 

Id. 
198. "The trial may be continued- upon motion of either party for good cause 
shown or by the court on its own motion if the interests of justice so require, unless the 
person named in the petition will be substantially prejudiced thereby." Id. § 14(a). 
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After the trial, the defendant may only be committed if the 
jury finds, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant is a sexually dangerous person under the statutory defini­
tion.199 If the jury makes such a determination, the defendant is to 
be committed "for an indeterminate period of a minimum of one 
day and a maximum of such person's natural life until discharged 
pursuant to the provisions of section 9."200 
H. Section 15-Hearing Instead of Criminal Trial 
Under section 15, a person charged with a sexual offense, who 
is found incompetent to stand trial, is subjected to a special proce­
dure in lieu of a typical criminal trial.201 First, the court must make 
a determination under section 12 that there is probable cause to 
believe that the' defendant did commit the acts that are the basis of 
This is in contrast to the strict time provisions found in section 13. See supra Part III.F 
for a discussion of § 13. While the defendant is awaiting trial, he or she shall be con­
fined to the treatment center or another secured facility for the duration of the trial. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 14(a) (2000). If the defendant is confined to the treat­
ment center, he or she is not entitled to segregation from the rest of the facility's popu­
lation. "If the person named in the petition is scheduled to be released from jail, house 
.of correction, prison or a facility of the department of youth services at any time prior 
to the final jUdgment, the court may temporarily commit such person te> the treatment 
center pending disposition of the petition." Id. § 14(e). 
199. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 14(d) (2000). Jury instructions in a sexually 
dangerous person trial should inform the jury that its decision must be unanimous and 
that the Commonwealth must prove. the following three things beyond a reasonable 
doubt: 
(1) that the defendant is a person who has been convicted of a sex offense within 
the meaning of chapter 123A (the jury may not revisit the issue of the defendant's 
guilt on the charged sex offenses if he or she has been convicted of such a crime); 
(2) that he or she suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder; 
(3) that makes him or her likely to engage in further sexual offenses if not con­
fined to a secure facility. 
The instruction should also include definitions of mental abnormality and personality 
disorder, and properly instruct the jury as to how it should evaluate and consider the 
evidence, including expert evidence. See Commonwealth v. Guy, Civ. No. BOO-287 
(Bristol County Super. Ct.; December 18,2000) (court's written instructions to thejury) 
(on file with author) .. 
200. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 14(d) (2000). The defendant, of course, may, 
after the petition against him or her has been filed and prior to trial, file motions to 
dismiss or to suppress evidence. In this sense, the petition acts as an indictment and any 
pretrial motions are consistent with ordinary criminal trial practice. While the statute 
does not expressly provide for a defendant's ability to file such motions, absent the 
ability of the defendant to move the court for relief prior to a probable cause hearing 
under section 12, the superior courts have entertained and allowed such motions. See 
also Commonwealth v. Bruno, 735 N.E.2d 1222, 1236-39 (Mass. 2000). 
201. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 15 (2000). 
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the underlying sexual offense,202 If the court finds that probable 
cause exists, it then holds a hearing on the issue of whether the 
defendant committed the charged acts,203 This hearing must com­
ply with all of the procedures specified in section 14, except the 
right to a jury,204 The rules of evidence and rights of a defendant in 
a criminal trial shall apply with the exception of the right not to be 
tried while incompetent.205 After this hearing, the court must make 
specific findings, and if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the acts charged, the court may then consider 
whether the person is sexually dangerous by proceeding under sec­
tions 13 and 14,206 A determination of the defendant's guilt on the 
underlying offense, or a fiilding that the defendant is a sexually dan­
gerous person under this section, is binding only as to the present 
chapter 123A proceedings and is not admissible in any subsequent 
criminal proceeding,207 
I. Section 16-Annual Reports Describing Treatments Offered 
This section mandates that "[t]he department of correction and 
the department of youth services shall annually prepare reports 
describing the treatment offered to each person who has been com­
202. Id. Section 12 actually deals with hearings designed to determine whether 
there is probable cause t'o proceed with civil commitment actions. Under section 15, the 
section 12 hearing is applied to a criminal matter in order to determine if there is a 
probable cause to believe that a person committed the underlying crime. In any event, 
the protections afforded by the probable cause hearing apply an appropriate standard 
of review for the court to use in evaluating the merits of the charges against the defen­
dant. Id. 
203. Jd. 
204. /d. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. The court must make specific findings as to the cause of the person's 
incompetence as well as to the effect that the person's incompetence had on his or her 
ability to consult with counsel and defend him or herself. Id. 
207. Id. This section is rather confusing, as it appears to subject an incompetent 
person charged with sexual offenses, to be tried without the right to a jury. A closer 
reading, however, reveals that the incompetent defendant is still afforded the right not 
to be tried while incompetent. 'Section 15, therefore, is nothing more than a mechanism 
by which a person can be committed and treated as a sexually dangerous person with­
out having to wait for a formal trial on the underlying offenses. The legislature seems 
to have enacted this section in order to more quickly treat allegedly dangerous sex 
offenders, and to prevent defendants from avoiding classification as sexually dangerous 
persons because of their incompetence or claims of incompetence. It further appears 
that a court's determination that a defendant is sexually dangerous as a result of section 
15 is temporary, and the defendant is allowed a full formal trial on the underlying al­
leged sexual offenses and new sexually dangerous person proceedings that result from 
any conviction on the sexual offenses. In other words, this section merely suspends the 
underlying criminal proceedings. 
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mitted to the treatment center"208 The reports are to be sent to the 
state house of representatives and the senate for review by the com­
mittees on ways and means as well as the joint committee on crimi­
nal justice.209 Another report is required that outlines the 
treatment center's plan for the administration and management of 
the treatment center.210 
IV. ADDITIONAL HIGHLIGHTED AREAS OF CONCERN 
Some points of interest may warrant consideration and further 
legal analysis. Chapter 123A appears to have a number of issues 
that could prove to be pitfalls for the practitioner who is unfamiliar 
with the nuances of the statute. Some notable inconsistencies in­
clude the two probable cause standards under section 12 temporary 
commitment proceedings,211 the statute's various procedural time 
requirements, and the possibility that some, but not all, of these 
requirements may be extended in the interests of justice,212 and the 
issue of jury unanimity under sections 9 and 14.213 
The three inconsistencies listed above are by no means an ex­
haustive list of the potential issues raised by the statute. Discussed 
below are some of the areas left open by the statute that the courts 
and the legislature have failed to resolve and that warrant some 
analysis as the law evolves. Before discussing these shortcomings, 
however, a few of the statute's strengths merit discussion. 
A. 	 Positive Aspects of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 
123A 
Chapter 123A has several strong points. First, the statute 
meets its legislative intention of protecting the public at large and 
rendering treatment to persons with mental abnormalities and per­
sonality disorders.214 Second, the statute does not subject every 
person who comes into contact with it to an indeterminate period of 
commitment; rather, the statute is only focused on those offenders 
who suffer from a form of mental illness and are likely to recommit 
208. 	 MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 16 (2000). 
209. 	 Id. 
210. Id. Sections 2A and 6A also provide that the department of correction con­
duct annual reviews of the current status of sexually dangerous persons who reside at, 
or are transferred from, the treatment center. 
211. 	 See discussion of section 12, supra Part III.E. 
212. 	 See discussion of section 13, supra Part III.F. 
213. 	 See discussion of sections 9 and 14, supra Part III.D, III.G. 
214. 	 See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A (2000). 
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a sexual offense.215 To reach these ends, the Department of Correc­
tion and/or the District Attorney or the Attorney General will con­
duct preliminary screenings before any defendant is subjected to 
chapter 123A proceedings. 
Moreover, the statute provides a number of procedural safe­
guards before subjecting a person to civil confinement. In particu­
lar, the court must find probable cause before conducting a 
hearing,216 and the prosecuting attorney must convince a unani­
mous jury217 that the defendant is, beyond a reasonable doubt,218 a 
sexually dangerous person within· the meaning of the statute.219 
The statute also sets forth strict procedural time frames220 and al­
lows the defendant access to funds for attorneys and experts.221 Fi­
nally, the statute provides a person who is found to be sexually 
dangerous the opportunity annually to 'petition the court for re­
lease, and, upon such petition, that person is entitled to a jury de­
termination as to whether he or she remains sexually dangerous.222 
B. Administrative Impact on the Superior Court 
Since chapter 123A, in its current incarnation, is relatively new, 
it is impossible for one to fully understand its impact on the legal 
system. It should be noted, however, that the statute places a heavy 
burden on the judicial resources of the superior court. To civilly 
confine one person under the statute, the superior court must pre­
side over a probable cause hearing,223 a trial (most likely a jury 
trial),224 and other motions including, but not limited to: motions to 
dismiss;225 motions to suppress or exclude evidence;226 motions to 
release funds;227 and motions addressing probable cause to tempo­
rarily commit the defendant while the proceedings take place.228 
Furthermore, a person who is civilly confined is entitled to chal­
215. Id. § 12. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. § 14(d). 
218. Id. 
219. See id. 
220. See discussion supra Part II.B.1-5, Part III.F-G. 
221. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, §§ 9, 13-14 (2000). 
222. Id. § 9. 
223. See id. § 12. 
224. See id. § 14. 
225. See discussion of cases supra notes 175, 177, 179. 
226. See discussion supra note 182. 
227. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, §§ 9, 13-14 (2000). 
228. See id. § 12( e). 
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lenge his or her status, on an annual basis, by a jury trial.229 Unde­
niably, these proceedings greatly tax the court's resources.230 
229. See id. § 9. 
230. The Department of Correction's prison statistics show that as of January 1, 
2000 there were 1893 persons committed' to the department's jurisdiction after being 
convicted of sexual offenses. Massachusetts Department of Correction, January 1, 2000 
Inmate Statistics, p.13, table 5, at http://www.state.ma.us/doc/pdfs/lloo.pdf.This repre­
sents.approximately 18% of the total number of inmates under the department's con­
trol at that time. Id. Similarly, in 1999, 1939 persons were convicted of sexual offenses 
and sentenced to Department of Correction facilities, representing 17% of the total 
number of persons convicted and turned over to the department. Massachusetts De­
partment of Correction, January 1, I9~ Inmate Statistics, p.5, table 5, at http://www. 
state.ma.us/doc/pdfs/1199.pdf. While not all of the persons convicted and incarcerated 
for sexual offenses will be eventually subjected to chapter 123A of the Massachusetts 
General Laws, the above statistics reflect the fact that there is a large pool of eligible 
candidates for confinement and treatment under the statute. . 
Sexually dangerous persons proceedings cOntinue to burden the Massachusetts 
trial courts. For example, the following is a review of the number of petitions brought 
under chapter 123, section 9 of the Massachusetts General Laws: 
Pending from prior years: 30 
New petitions filed 2000: 31 
Total for 2000: 61 
Hearings Scheduled: 30 
Withdrawals: 8 
ContinuanCes: 2 
Dismissals: . 1 
Fmal Judgment Entered: 19 
Cases Carried Over to 2001: 31 
Judge Hearings Scheduled: 26 
Average Length of Jury Hearings: 5.78 days 
Bench Hearings Scheduled: 4 
Length of Bench Hearings: 3 days 
Average Time Between File Date and Scheduled Hearing 22 months 
Date: 
Average Delay Between Scheduled Hearing Date and Actuar 8.5 months 
Hearing Date: 
Massachusetts Judicial Branch, Superior Court Department, Fiscal Year 2000, Petition 
for Discharge Hearing-Sexually Dangerous Person-G.L. c. 123A, § 9, at http://www. 
state.ma.us/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/superiorcourtldangerouspetitions.html. 
In reviewing the above statistics, it must be highlighted that the number of new 
petitions filed in 2000 is equal to the number of cases carried over to 2001. Addition­
ally, even disregarding the average delay of 8.5 months between the scheduled and 
actual hearing dates, the average time between the file date of a petition and the hear­
ing date on the petition is approximately 22 months. This statistic is alarming as, under 
chapter 123A, an inmate committed as a sexually dangerous person is entitled to file a 
new petition every year. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 9 (2000). Thus, it appears that 
an inmate would be annually filing a new petition despite the fact that the court had not 
yet held a hearing on his or her previous one. 
Again, it should be noted that the above statistics are for section 9 petitions and 
only reflect a small portion of the proceedings under chapter 123A. As the statute has 
only recently been enacted; the number of persons now subject to its provisions does 
not even approach the number of persons potentially affected by it in the future. Con­
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Additionally, the time restrictions found in the statute may force 
chapter 123A cases to take priority over other important judicial 
matters in order to preserve a defendant's statutory and constitu­
tional due process rights. 
C. Duty To Inform About Plea Impact 
Generally, when a person pleads guilty to a crime, the court 
must make that person aware of the impact of his or her plea.231 To 
date, however, the SJC has stated that being subjected to the provi­
sions of chapter 123A "is but one of many contingent consequences 
of being confined"232 after conviction and, therefore, the court need 
not explain the consequences of potential chapter 123A proceed­
ings to a defendant prior to accepting his or her plea of guilty to a 
sexual offense.233 This rule differs from the statutory requirement 
finement under chapter 123A is unlike incarceration for other offenses whereby each 
year a number of inmates are released and new persons are sentenced. Instead, be­
cause there is no definite period of commitment under this law, the number of inmates 
could grow exponentially if the number of released persons is not similar to the number 
of newly committed persons. The result is both a new round of initial commitment 
proceedings each year, and a growing number of section 9 release petitions that trigger 
related proceedings, petitions that can be filed by each inmate once a year. 
Finally, the delays reflected in the above statistics are not necessarily the fault of 
the Superior Court or its lack of resources. As discussed throughout this article, other 
factors can cause delays, such as the limited number of qualified examiners approved by 
the Department of Correction, or the fact that the Commonwealth or Attorney Gen­
eral's Office does not diligently foil6w the schedule of events set forth by the statute. 
231. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(3) (2001). 
232. Commonwealth v. Morrow, 296 N.E.2d 468, 474 (Mass. 1973). 
233. Id. Andrews v. Commonwealth, 282 N.E.2d 376,378 (Mass. 1972). Since the 
repeal of some of chapter 123A's sections in 1990, the courts have not established any 
new definitive rule on this issue. Some courts, however, appear to suggest that, while 
not constitutionally mandated, informing a defendant of all of the consequences of 
pleading guilty to a sexval offense may be appropriate. See Commonwealth v. Frede­
rico, 666 N.E.2d 1017, 1020 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (discussing defendant's possible fu­
ture status as a sexually dangerous person as appropriate and did not improperly 
interfere with the defendant's plea agreement or impropedy influence him to withdraw 
his guilty plea); Commonwealth v. Anderson, No. 819495, 1993 WL 818847, at *1 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 1993) (Toomey, J.) (refraining from addressing the court's failure 
to inform the defendant during a plea colloquy that the plea could result in civil com­
mitment under chapter 123A but stating that the delivery of such information may now 
be required by rule 12(c)(3)(B) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
which was not effective until after the defendant entered his plea). 
For a recent discussion of plea colloquies witq respect to sexual offender registra­
tion and notification laws, see Commonwealth v. Albert A., 729 N.E.2d 312 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2000). In discussing the adequacy of a plea, the court stated: 
The constitutional adequacy of a plea, however, does not require that a defen­
dant be advised of consequences that are contingent or collateral to the plea. 
That one adjudged in violation of [a sexual offense] might be subject to the 
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that a court inform a defendant prior to his or her entering a plea 
that such a plea could result in deportation or other immigration 
and naturalization difficulti~s.234 
D. The Potential Malpractice Problem 
Though the court is not, as of yet, required to explain to a de­
fendant the potential consequences of pleading guilty to a crime 
enumerated in section 1 of chapter 123A,235 a defense lawyer 
should offer an explanation to his or her client in order to avoid a 
future legal malpractice claim. An attorney owes his or her client 
an obligation to exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill in the 
performance of his or her legal duties.236 In order to recover in a 
malpractice claim against an attorney, the plaintiff must establish 
that: (1) an attorney client relationship existed; (2) the defendant 
attorney failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in handling the 
plaintiff's case; (3) the plaintiff incurred a loss; and (4) the defen­
dant attorney's malpractice was the proximate cause of the 10ss.237 
Assume for argument sake that a defense attorney failed to 
inform his or her client that the crime he or she was pleading guilty 
to could result in future civil confinement. In such a case, it is clear 
that an attorney client relationship exists. One could argue that the 
attorney's omission constituted a failure to exercise reasonable care 
and skill in handling the client's case. Moreover, one could cer­
tainly argue that indefinite civil confinement constitutes a "loss." 
Whether or not one could prove proximate cause, or whether the 
malpractice action would ultimately prevail is, of course, a question 
that most lawyers prefer to avoid. An attorney in this position 
should inform his or her client of any potential chapter 123A pro­
ceedings that may result from the client's guilty plea. One possible 
registration and notification provisions of the sex offender act is but one of the 
many contingent or collateral consequences of such an adjudication. 
Id. at 314. 
234. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 29D (2000). 
235. See Andrews, 282 N.E.2d at 378. 
236. See Meyer v. Wagner, 709 N.E.2d 784, 791 (Mass. 1999) ("The law demands 
that attorneys handle their cases with knowledge, skill, and diligence, but it does not 
demand that they be perfect or infallible, and it does not demand that they always 
secure optimum outcomes for their clients.") (quoting Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, 
Kweskin & Kuriansky, 646 A.2d 195 (Conn. 1994»; see also David A. Berry, Legal 
Malpractice in Massachusetts, 63 MASS. L. REv. 15 (1978); David A. Berry, Legal Mal­
practice in Massachusetts: Recent Developments, 78 MAss. L. REv. 74 (1993). 
237. See Miller v. Mooney, 725 N.E.2d 545, 549 (Mass. 2000); Wagner, 709 N.E.2d 
at 791; DiPiero v. Goodman, 436 N.E.2d 998, 999 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). 
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suggestion is getting an affidavit from the client confirming that he 
or she understands the potential chapter 123A ramifications. 
E. Extended Period of Probation 
Another concern regarding the present incarnation of chapter 
123A of the Massachusetts General Laws is that it allows for some 
confusion over the status of defendants once they are released from 
the treatment center. In Commonwealth v. Sheridan,238 the Massa­
chusetts Court of Appeals ruled that where a defendant had been 
sentenced by the superior court to a period of probation to be 
served "from and after any sentences [he] is now serving," this pro~ 
bationary period would commence after the defendant was released 
from the treatment center.239 The court stated thatthe purposes of 
probation would best be served by ordering that the defendant be 
subjected to its terms after his commitment.240 The court rejected 
the defendant's argument that the Commonwealth and the proba­
tion department violated his rights to due process and fundamental 
fairness by failin& to make an effort to determine his probationary 
status at the time h~ was originally released from prison and prior 
to his placement in the treatment center.241 
The concern with·Sheridan is 'that it further extends any period 
of punishment by allowing a court to refuse to permit time in a 
238. 743 N.E.2d 856 (Mass. App: Ct. 2001). 
239. Id. at 858-60. 
240. [d. at 859 ("The purpose of a probationary sentence is rehabilitation of the 
probationer and protection of the public. It is granted with hope that the probationer 

will be able to rehabilitate himself or herself under the supervision of the probation 

officer. ") (citations omitted). 

The court also stated that: 

We are sure that the experienced sentencing judge [Ford, J.] was aware of the 
purposes of probation. By imposing the probationary sentence to commence 
after the sentences the defendant was then serving, it is clear the sentencing 
judge intended the defendant to be supervised by a probation officer at the 
time he was released from custody and returned to the community. In our 
view, the fact that the defendant's release to the community was delayed be­
cause of an intervening civil commitment did not change the sentencing 
judge's intent to have the defendant supervised upon his release from custody. 
Further, we reject the defendant's argument that his probationary sen­
tence ran concurrently with his commitment I;lt the treatment center. While 
committed to the treatment center, the defendant was separated from society 
and in an institutionalized setting that eliminated any ·need for the supervision 
of a probation officer. The two goals of probation - rehabilitation under the 
supervision of a probation officer and the protection of society - are only 
brought into play when the offender is released into the community. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
241. See id. at 859-61. 
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treatment center to run concurrently with a probation period. This 
is significant because it becomes a way in which the defendant is 
subject to liberty constraints and is faced with the realistic fear that 
simple probation violations could result in another round of 
incarcerations. 
Alternatively, one could view Sheridan as serving valid and 
logical purposes. First, allowing the court to order probation to be 
served after a stay at the treatment center appears to be consistent 
with traditional probationary practice, whereby a rehabilitated in­
mate is eased back into society. In the case of a sexually dangerous 
person, it would make sense to allow probation only after he or she 
underwent the necessary treatment.. This would also allow for an 
additional safeguard of the public because the courts would not re­
lease the defendant directly from treatment Intosociety, but would 
require the agencies of the Commonwealth to keep tabs on such 
defendants and incarcerate him if he begins to participate in certain 
detrimental practices. Second, in a strictly iogical sense, if the 
courts were to discover that, as a matter of law, probation and treat­
ment must run concurrently, they would be ruling that inmates in a 
treatment center are subject to criminal incarceration, thus defeat­
ing some of the foundation for upholding the statute· in the first 
~oo. . . 
The rebuttal to the above arguments is that chapter 123A of 
the Massachusetts General Laws already h~s provisions in place for 
easing sexually dangerous persons back into society. These provi­
sions, along with sex offender registration laws, are sufficient public 
safeguards. Convicted persons should not be subject to further 
punishment and repeated threats of incarceration for minor proba­
tion violations such as substance abuse or breaking curfew. Addi­
tionally, one could contend that placing treatment between two 
periods of criminal punishment proves that the treatment is also 
criminal punishment. 
In any event, while Sheridan does create a unique wrinkle in 
the punishment and treatment of se~ ·offenders, the extension of 
probation after the term of treatment appears to be a discretionary 
measure left to the sentencing court. Sheridan did not establish a 
mandatory rule, rather it only looked to the specific circumstances 
of that case in determining the judicial intent. 
F. Use of Expert Evidence at Hearings and Triai 
Since a jury or court must make the ultimate determination as 
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to whether the defendant is sexually dangerous, it is crucial to have 
expert evidence as to the defendant's likelihood of recidivism and 
whether he or she suffers from a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder.242 As mentioned above, the statute places a great deal of 
emphasis on reports by qualified examiners.243 Because the Massa­
chusetts Department of Correction must approve examiners, there 
is a possibility that a defendant would experience some difficulty in 
locating a truly independent examiner.244 This is not to say that an 
examiner would necessarily be biased in his or her opinion in favor 
of the Commonwealth. It should simply be noted that the availabil­
ity of examiners who are able to conduct an independent examina­
tion might be limited by this rule.245 This rule also appears to be 
somewhat in contrast with the ordinary rules regarding the admis­
sion of expert evidence. In general, the court has the discretion to 
determine whether a witness is an expert in the relevant field.246 
Under chapter 123A, however, the court's responsibilities are 
limited in some respects by the requirement that the Department of 
Correction designate qualified examiners.247 While section 14 of 
the statute does not expressly prevent a defendant from using non­
qualified examiners as experts, the language is ambiguous and its 
interplay with the other sections of the statute could be read to es­
tablish such an exclusion.248 Essentially, this removes some of the 
discretion to qualify an expert from the court and places it back into 
the hands of the Department of Correction, an agency that works 
242. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 14(b)-(c) (2000). 
243. See id. §§ 9, 13; see also supra Part IV (discussing the role of qualified 
examiners). 
244. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text (outlining criteria for quali­
fied examiners). 
245. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text (qualified examiners). 
246. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585-88 (1993) (hold­
ing that the trial judge must determine that the evidence is both reliable and relevant in 
order to allow expert evidence to be admitted); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 
1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) (establishing that a trial judge has a "gatekeeper" role in deter­
mining whether the process or theory underlying the expert's opinion lacks reliability); 
Letch v. Daniels, 514 N.E.2d 675, 677 (Mass. 1987) ("The crucial issue is whether the 
witness has sufficient education, training, experience and familiarity with the subject 
matter of the testimony."). However, the proposed expert need not previously have 
encountered the exact set of facts now before her. See HON. PAUL J. LIACOS ET AL., 
HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE § 7.7.2, at 401 (7th ed. 1999) (citing Mc­
Laughlin v. Bd. of Selectmen, 662 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. 1996) (holding that excluding testi­
mony of a real estate expert, because she had not bought, sold, or owned land in the 
location about which she testified, was error)). 
247. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 2 (2000). 
248. Compare id. § 13, with id. § 14. 
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closely with the Commonwealth in these situations.249 Although 
problematic, the role of the qualified examiner would most likely 
survive any legal challenge raising the argument that it conflicts 
with the traditional evidentiary standards. The legislature has the 
authority to promulgate evidentiary rules, including those regarding 
witnesses.25o Thus, the courts would resolve any conflict between 
chapter 123A and the Daubert/Lanigan standard in favor of the 
statute.251 
CONCLUSION 
The potential problems mentioned in the last portion of this 
article undoubtedly represent just the beginning of the complica­
tions that will arise from chapter 123A. The statute presents so 
many legal questions partly because it is a civil statute being imple­
mented with a hybrid of criminal and civil procedure. It is impossi­
ble to determine how the courts will resolve these problems in the 
future. It seems logical, however, to conclude that legal precedents 
such as Hendricks and Bruno have, to a large degree, precluded any 
constitutional arguments that a defendant might raise. Any mean­
249. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 12(a) (2000) (stating that the Department 
of Correction or other agencies with control over inmates convicted of sexual offenses 
is responsible for identifying those inmates who, in their opinion, are likely to meet the 
criteria for a sexually dangerous person). 
250. See Meunier's Case, 66 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Mass. 1946) (holding that the legis­
lature is also permitted to enact procedural and evidentiary rules, "provided they do 
not violate constitutional requirements or deprive any person of his or her constitu­
tional rights"). 
251. There is some indication, however, that the Massachusetts courts would not 
totally preclude the Daubert/Lanigan analysis in a chapter 123A case. In Common­
wealth v. Two Juveniles, the SJC noted that "[t]he Supreme Court of the United States 
has recognized that a criminal defendant's constitutional right to present evidence 
shown to be relevant and likely to be significant may override a rule of exclusion en­
forced in the State in which the trial is held." 491 N.E.2d 234, 238 (Mass. 1986) (citing 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974)). Additionally, a recent Massachusetts Justice 
of the Superior Court, in reviewing the use of expert testimony at a sexually dangerous 
person proceeding, ruled that: . 
There is no logical reason why conclusions based on personal observations or 
clinical experience should not be subject to the Lanigan analysis. "That a per­
son qualifies as an expert does not endow his testimony with magic qualities." 
Observation informed by experience is but one scientific technique that is no 
less susceptible to Lanigan analysis than other types of scientific methodology. 
The gatekeeping function pursuant to Lanigan is the same regardless of the 
nature of the methodology used: to determine whether "the process or theory 
underlying a scientific expert's opinion lacks reliability [ such] that [the] opin­
ion should not reach the trier of fact." 
Commonwealth v. Reese, Civ. No. 00-0181-B, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 112, at *23 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 5,2001) (memorandum and order on probable cause). 
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ingful change in chapter 123A's policies, therefore, will have to be 
made through legislation. 
